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As Justice Douglas wrote in Skinner v. Oklahoma, procreation is one of the “basic civil rights of man” and along with marriage it is “fundamental to the very existence and survival of
the race” and the state’s interference with it threatens to have
1
“subtle, far-reaching and devastating effects.” And yet the
United States and other countries regulate a wide range of reproductive activities such as forbidding anonymous sperm do-

1. 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
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nation; funding abstinence education; criminalizing brothersister incest; preventing the sale of sperm, eggs, or surrogacy
services; and forbidding single individuals from accessing reproductive technologies. In justifying these and countless other
regulations of reproduction legislatures, courts, and commentators have relied (at least in part) on an idiom that I call Best
Interests of the Resulting Child (BIRC); a focus on the best interests of the child who will (absent state intervention) result
from these forms of reproduction.
In this Article, one of two papers in a larger project, my
goal is to reveal and delve into the “secret ambition” of best in2
terests discourse in the regulation of reproduction; I aim to
show that its “real significance” lies “not in what it says but in
what it stops us from saying,” that is, the way it “takes the political charge out of contentious issues and deflects expressive
3
contention away from” this area of law.
My goal is to show that the BIRC idiom is a nonstarter. Instead, it is a way of talking about the regulation of reproduction
that avoids confrontation with justificatory idioms that are disturbing, controversial, and illiberal; idioms that may justify eugenics, mandatory enhancement, or other problematic ideas.
My goal in this Article is to force that confrontation and to
4
evaluate the plausibility of four substitute justifications. To
preface my conclusion, because these substitute justifications
are either implausible or unsettling, they make many if not all
of these regulations of reproduction unappealing.
More specifically, this Article makes two main claims.
First, while the BIRC approach is extremely prevalent as a justification for regulating reproduction, it is empty and misleading. Part I of this Article defends that claim. I first briefly set
the stage by introducing a framework for describing the regula2. This is sometimes called child welfare or child-protective, but I will
just label it “best interests” going forward.
3. I borrow this term “secret ambition” from Dan Kahan, who has sought
to make a similar showing as to the role played by the “deterrence” idiom in
criminal law. Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L.
REV. 413, 416–17 (1999). More precisely, Kahan’s claim is that the “rhetoric of
deterrence displaces an alternative expressive idiom that produces incessant
illiberal conflict over status” such that “[c]itizens of diverse commitments converge on the deterrence idiom to satisfy social norms against contentious public moralizing; public officials likewise converge on it to minimize opposition to
their preferred policy outcomes.” Id.
4. In this respect my project parts ways from Kahan’s, whose feeling
about the masking quality of the deterrence idiom is more mixed. See id. at
477–500.
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tion of reproduction. I then demonstrate both the prevalence of
the BIRC justifications in the field and the attraction of this idiom from a political theory perspective, and explain why BIRC
justifications (and reasonable reformulations thereof) are unworkable. For this last step, I draw on work in bioethics and
the philosophy of identity to show why it is problematic to say
that children are harmed if brought into existence with lives
worth living. I also draw on some parallel legal reasoning from
the wrongful life tort liability jurisprudence, and show why attempts at reformulating the BIRC approach also fail. This Part
largely summarizes work I have done in a companion paper,
Regulating Reproduction: The Problem With Best Interests,
such that readers familiar with that work may want to skip
5
ahead.
The remainder of this Article is devoted to a second claim:
if we go beyond best interests, four possible substitute justifications for regulating reproduction exist—Reproductive Externalities, Wronging while Overall Benefitting, Virtue Ethics, and
Legal Moralism—all of which face considerable problems in
justifying State intervention. Of the four, I ultimately think
Reproductive Externalities (the least-discussed of the group in
the scholarly literature) is the most promising. When properly
understood, however, even this approach can justify only a
much narrower swath of regulation of reproduction than currently exists, such that much of the existing law in this area
cannot be justified.
More specifically, Part II considers Reproductive Externalities, wherein the regulation of reproduction is justified not by
harm to the resulting child (the BIRC justification) but to costs
that reproduction imposes on third parties. Besides a worrisome closeness to the eugenics movement of old, such an approach faces challenges relating to the attenuation of harms
and how to assess the cost of diffuse harms, underinclusivity,
the possibility of making parents internalize the externality as
an alternative solution, and implications for duties to enhance,
among other obstacles.
Part III considers a more deontological approach which I
call Wronging while Overall Benefiting. This approach shifts
the criterion for moral wrongfulness from harm to a conception
of wrong absent harm, or to a conception of harm where the
fact that an individual is overall benefited is insufficient to save
5. See generally I. Glenn Cohen, Regulating Reproduction: The Problem
with Best Interests, 96 MINN. L. REV. 423 (2011).
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the act from being wrongful. I focus on a version of this argument most tied to legal application developed in the wrongful
6
life context by Seana Shiffrin, but other versions of this ap7
proach also exist. I offer several critiques of Shiffrin’s brilliant
work.
Part IV considers two related but distinct justificatory idioms of Legal Moralism—the use of criminal law or other regulatory tools to deter acts that neither harm nor offend but undermine public morality, and Virtue Ethics, the view that
concern over the virtue of the parents making these decisions
justifies intervention. I suggest that the Legal Moralist approach is only plausible for a subset of reproductive regulation
and faces political-theory and constitutional-law hurdles. As to
the Virtue Ethics approaches, I show how arguments along
these lines critiquing parental attempts at enhancement of
their children and sex selection will not serve as a good ground
for the types of regulations I have discussed. Finally, I conclude
by suggesting what the regulation of reproduction might look
like in light of the re-examination I have forced here.
It is hard to exaggerate the importance of this project: if it
succeeds, I will have shown that the prevailing justifications
offered for the regulation of reproduction, and most of the regulations they seek to justify, are either intellectually bankrupt or
carry with them disturbing and problematic implications such
that they are better off discarded. While I find the Reproductive
Externalities approach the most promising, I show that when
properly understood, even this approach can justify only a
much narrower swath of regulation of reproduction than currently exists, such that much of the existing law in this area
cannot be justified.

6. See generally Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Wrongful Life, Procreative Responsibility, and the Significance of Harm, 5 LEGAL THEORY 117 passim
(1999).
7. See, e.g., Dena S. Davis, Genetic Dilemmas and the Child’s Right to an
Open Future, 27 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 7 (1997); Carter Dillard, Child Welfare and Future Persons, 43 GA. L. REV. 367 (2009); Elizabeth Harman, Can
We Harm and Benefit in Creating?, 18 PHIL. PERSP. 89, 93 (2004); F.M. Kamm,
Baselines and Compensation, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1367, 1385 (2003); James
Woodward, The Non-Identity Problem, 96 ETHICS 804 (1986).
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I. THE PROBLEM WITH BEST INTERESTS: A
FRAMEWORK; A JUSTIFICATORY IDIOM; AND A
PROBLEM
In this Part, I begin by briefly setting out a framework for
discussing the regulation of reproduction. I then explain how
one particular type of justificatory idiom, what I call Best Interests of the Resulting Child (BIRC), is relied upon by courts,
legislators, and scholars, in part because it is attractive from a
political theoretical perspective. However, I show that the idiom is problematic for reasons akin to those recognized in the
wrongful life tort jurisprudence and by the philosopher Derek
Parfit’s “Non-Identity Problem.” I also briefly discuss how
tempting reformulations of the BIRC argument are nonstarters. All this, which captures work I have done in a com8
panion Article, serves as a prelude to the main contribution of
this Article: to show why the BIRC justificatory idiom is vacuous and to plumb what really lies beneath it.
A. FRAMEWORK: THE THREE DIMENSIONS OF STATE
INTERVENTIONS AIMED AT INFLUENCING REPRODUCTION
As in the companion Article, Regulating Reproduction, I
find it useful to describe State attempts to influence reproduction through a taxonomy with three dimensions, one to which I
will return throughout the Article.
The first dimension is the target reproductive decision (or
simply “target” for short) the State seeks to influence. For our
purposes we can crudely distinguish three such targets: wheth9
er, when, and with whom individuals reproduce.
Programs that sterilize the severely mentally ill or deny
access to reproductive technologies to those over age fifty affect
whether these individuals will reproduce. Abstinence education
aims to delay reproduction by teenagers or other unmarried individuals and thus influences when individuals reproduce. Prohibitions on brother-sister incest, programs aimed at carrier
screening for Tay-Sachs or other heritable genetic disorders,
and statutes barring sperm donor anonymity attempt to influence with whom individuals reproduce.

8. See generally Cohen, supra note 5, at 423 (2011).
9. For other purposes the “how” dimension—for example, whether to
permit cloning as a form of reproduction—may also matter, but not for the examples I discuss.
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The second dimension goes to the means by which the State
seeks to influence the target decisions (“means” for short). These
interventions can roughly be ordered from strongest to weakest
in terms of their level of intrusion. Physical alteration is the
most intrusive, for example, sterilization of the severely mentally retarded. Criminal prohibition is also extremely intrusive,
for example, making it a crime to engage in brother-sister incest or to purchase surrogacy services. Less intrusively, the
State may make certain status determinations immutable (particularly as to parentage) and/or make contracts surrounding
reproduction unenforceable; for example, California treats gestational surrogacy contracts (where the surrogate carries the
fetus to term but does not contribute the egg for fertilization) as
enforceable, but not traditional surrogacy contracts (where the
surrogate is both the genetic mother and carries the fetus to
10
term). More weakly, the State may also create default status
determinations and set the altering rules, for example, the older
version of the Uniform Parentage Act still in place in many jurisdictions absolves a sperm donor of parental responsibilities
only if the recipient was married and the procedure was done
through a licensed physician, thereby setting conditions to
11
overcome a default parentage rule. Still less intrusively, the
State may selectively fund certain types of reproductive assistance—in the United States a number of states use state-level
insurance mandates to force insurers to cover in vitro fertilization (IVF; an extremely expensive procedure), but use them selectively to fund only particular types of reproduction through
language limiting it to married individuals, thus excluding sin12
gle individuals and gays and lesbians. An even less intrusive
intervention is informational, for example, the State’s funding
of abstinence education or public health campaigns encouraging carrier testing for Tay-Sachs and other heritable genetic
disorders.
The third dimension goes to the justification or, more often,
justifications that are, or could be, offered in favor of these interventions (“justification” for short). At a high and somewhat
crude level, it is useful to distinguish four different families of
10. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 783–84 (Cal. 1993); In re
Marriage of Moschetta, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 893, 900–01 (Ct. App. 1994).
11. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5( b), 9B U.L.A. 377, 408 (1973).
12. See, e.g., I. Glenn Cohen & Daniel L. Chen, Trading-Off Reproductive
Technology and Adoption: Does Subsidizing IVF Decrease Adoption Rates and
Should it Matter?, 95 MINN. L. REV. 485, 502 n.83, 536–40 (2010).
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justifications: (1) the Harm Principle, tracing back to Mill, suggesting that prevention of harm to others is a justification for
13
state action; (2) Paternalism, the argument that the prevention of harm to the actor herself—usually calling on some conception of false consciousness or bounded rationality—is a justification for State action; (3) Wronging Without Harming, the
argument that preventing the wronging (usually in a deontological sense) of another, even if one does not harm him, is a
justification for state action; finally, (4) Moralism and Virtue,
suggesting that though a particular action causes neither harm
to the actor nor to third-parties, its negative effects on public
morality generally or the virtue/character of individual actors is
14
a justification for state action.
For our purposes, it is useful to further subdivide the
Harm Principle form of justification to distinguish between
claims of harm to the children resulting from reproductive decisions (the BIRC justification) and claims of harm to other thirdparties (a reproductive externalities justification I discuss toward the end of this Article).
The three dimensions and their elements are summarized
in Table 1 and can be used to describe many regulations of
reproduction.
For example, abstinence education is aimed at influencing
when individuals reproduce (target), does so through information provision (means), and is typically justified based on a
Harm Principle rationale targeting the interests of the children
who will result from teenage pregnancy as well as legal moralism aimed at discouraging premarital sex (justification),
though other forms of justification are also possible. Prohibitions
on sperm donor anonymity influence with whom individuals reproduce (target), through criminal prohibition (means), and are
typically justified through a Harm Principle rationale targeting
the interests of the children who will result (justification).
As is often the case in the fractal world of legal analysis,
things can get much more complex, but for present purposes
these three dimensions are a useful starting point, and I will

13. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 13 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., 1978)
(1859) (“That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over
any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to
others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.”).
14. Cf. JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM
TO OTHERS 26–27 (1984) (developing a much fuller taxonomy of justifications
for criminal law interventions).
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only add additional layers of complexity as needed. While I
have designed this taxonomy for this project and its aims, I also
think the taxonomy is very useful on its own.
Table 1:
Three Dimensions of Regulation Reproduction

1.

2.

3.

Target Reproduction Decision
a. When One Reproduces
b. Whether One Reproduces
c. With Whom One Reproduces
Means By Which the State Influences Reproduction (ordered from
most to least intrusive)
a. Physical Alteration
b. Criminal Prohibition
c. Immutable Status Determination
d. Unenforceability of Contract
e. Default Status Determination
f. Selective Funding
g. Information Provision
Justification Offered for Intervention
a. Harm Principle
i.
Harm to Child (Best Interests of Resulting Child)
ii. Harm to Third Parties (Reproductive Externalities)
b. Paternalism
c. Moralism and Virtue (Especially Legal Moralism)
d. Wronging Without Harming

15. To wit, I briefly discuss distinctions as to the severity of the reproductive interests that are being stymied—for example, a governmental intervention that prevented you from having an eighth genetically related child when
you already had seven might be viewed quite differently than an intervention
that prevented you from having any genetically related children, and short delays in the timing of reproduction might be thought of as less severe than
longer ones. See, e.g., Dan W. Brock, Shaping Future Children: Parental
Rights and Societal Interests, 13 J. POL. PHIL. 377, 380 (2005); I. Glenn Cohen,
The Right Not to Be a Genetic Parent?, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1115, 1194 (2008);
Daniel Statman, The Right to Parenthood: An Argument for a Narrow Interpretation, 10 ETHICAL PERSP. 224, 227–28 (2003). One could also draw an additional prior distinction between State attempts to influence the reproduction
of others (the focus of this Article) versus attempts by other individuals (for
example, charities offering voluntary sterilization programs for poor women).
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B. JUSTIFICATORY IDIOM: BEST INTERESTS OF THE RESULTING
CHILD JUSTIFICATIONS, THEIR ATTRACTION AND PROMINENCE
1. The Prominence of BIRC: Some Examples
In a large set of areas, the Best Interests of the Resulting
Child (BIRC) idiom has been a prominent (indeed in some cases
the predominant) justification used to defend policies that influence when, whether, and with whom we reproduce. In this
Section I concentrate on seven examples that I will return to
throughout this Article. In a companion paper I have demon16
strated this reliance with exhaustive quotations and citations,
so here I just briefly set out the categories with only one or two
examples of that reliance.
Criminalizing Brother-Sister and First Cousin-First
Cousin Incest Between Adults: Brother-sister and cousin
incest is still illegal in many U.S. states, and a similar ban was
recently upheld in England in a case involving siblings who
17
were adopted into separate families as children. “The most
commonly cited rationale for prohibiting consensual relations is
that incestuous relationships have the potential to create chil18
dren with genetic problems if the parties reproduce,” a perfect
illustration of a BIRC justification. The reason is that in an incestuous coupling there is a higher likelihood that both partners will carry the same recessive gene, thus increasing the
likelihood of genetic abnormalities from a two-to-three percent
risk rate of severe abnormalities in non-consanguineous relationships to between a thirty-one and forty-four percent risk of
19
severe abnormalities for sibling sexual relationships. Scholars
like Naomi Cahn have accepted the BIRC justification for these
rules in principle, with some concerns as to over-inclusivity
prompting them to argue for more narrowly tailored versions of
20
these rules.
16. See Cohen, supra note 5, at 429–45.
17. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:78 (2012); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM.
LAW § 3-323 (West 2011); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-702, 28-703 (2008); Naomi
Cahn, Accidental Incest: Drawing The Line—Or The Curtain?—For Reproductive Technology, 32 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 59, 61, 89 (2009).
18. Jennifer M. Collins et al., Punishing Family Status, 88 B.U. L. REV.
1327, 1391 (2008).
19. Cahn, supra note 17, at 85.
20. E.g., Courtney Megan Cahill, Same-Sex Marriage, Slippery Slope
Rhetoric, and the Politics of Disgust: A Critical Perspective on Contemporary
Family Discourse and the Incest Taboo, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1543, 1570 (2005);
Cahn, supra note 17, at 86–87.
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Abstinence Education/Funding: The U.S. government
has spent more than $1.5 billion to promote abstinence-only
education in a series of programs, and among the conditions of
receiving that funding is that the program “teaches that bearing children out-of-wedlock is likely to have harmful conse21
quences for the child.” This same BIRC justification is also
apparent in support for these programs by conservative com22
mentators.
Reproductive Technology Access Restrictions by
Age, Marital Status, Sexual Orientation: Countries like
Italy, France, the United Kingdom, Greece, Japan and the Australian states of Western Australia, South Australia, and Victoria, have put in place restrictions on access to reproductive
technology requiring that users be below a certain age, mar23
ried, and/or heterosexual. These restrictions are often premised on BIRC-type concerns, for example, the Italian parliament’s concern with “avoiding psycho-social damage to the
child,” and the U.K. Act’s requirement that “a woman shall not
be provided with treatment services unless account has been
taken of the welfare of the child who may be born as a result of
24
the treatment.”
21. 42 U.S.C. § 710( b)(2) (2006); BONNIE SCOTT JONES & MICHELLE
MOVAHED, AM. CONSTITUTION SOC’Y, LESSON ONE: YOUR GENDER IS YOUR
DESTINY—THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF TEACHING SEX STEREOTYPES IN ABSTINENCE-ONLY PROGRAMS 3–4 (2008), available at http://www.acslaw.org/
files/Jones%20-%20Movahed%20Issue%20Brief.pdf.
22. See, e.g., Patrick F. Fagan, How Broken Families Rob Children of
Their Chances for Future Prosperity, HERITAGE FOUND. BACKGROUNDER, June
11, 1999, No. 1283 available at http://www.heritage.org/Research/Family/
BG1283.cfm.
23. E.g., Infertility Treatment Act 1995 (Vic) s 8 (Austl.), available at
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/vic/hist_act/ita1995264.pdf; Human Reproductive Technology Act 1991 (WA) ss 4, 23(c) (Austl.), available at http://www
.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/wa/consol_act/hrta1991331/index.html#s23; Reproductive Technology Act 1988 (SA) ss 10( b), 13(3)( b) (Austl.), available at www
.legislation.sa.gov.au/LZ/C/A/ASSISTED%20REPRODUCTIVE%20TREATME
NT%20ACT%201988/2000.07.05_(1996.08.01)/1988.10.PDF; Nomos (2002:
3089) [Medically Assisted Human Reproduction], Official Gazette of the Hellenic Republic 2002, 1:1455 (Greece), available at www.bioethics.gr/media/
pdf/biolaw/human/law_3089_en.pdf; DEP’T OF HEALTH, REVIEW OF THE HUMAN FERTILISATION AND EMBRYOLOGY ACT, 2006, Cm. 6989, at 9 (U.K.) available at http://www.dh.gov.uk/prod_consum_dh/groups/dh_digitalassets/@dh/@en/
documents/digitalasset/dh_073065.pdf; Rachel Anne Fenton, Catholic Doctrine
Versus Women’s Rights: The New Italian Law On Assisted Reproduction, 14
MED. L. REV. 73, 84 –89 (2006); Rachel Brehm King, Redefining Motherhood:
Discrimination in Legal Parenthood in Japan, 18 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 189,
214 –15 (2009).
24. DEP’T OF HEALTH, supra note 23; Fenton, supra note 23, at 88. The
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While no U.S. state currently bans Assisted Reproductive
Technology (ART) use by aged, single or lesbian, gay, bisexual,
or transsexual (LGBT) individuals, state legislatures have re25
cently introduced bills to do so. U.S. access restrictions instead primarily take the form of physician self-regulation, with
groups like the American Society for Reproductive Medicine—
whose 1997 policy statement suggests that “postmenopausal
pregnancy should be discouraged,” and treating physicians
should carefully consider not only threats to the woman’s
health or that of the child, but also “the provision for child rearing . . . [b]ecause parenting is both an emotionally stressful and
physically demanding experience, older women and their partners may be unable to meet the needs of a growing child and
maintain a long parental relationship,” and because “children
could resent having mothers old enough to be grandmothers
26
and be adversely affected psychologically and socially.” The
American College of Pediatricians’ has a similar position state27
ment from 2004 on LGBT access to reproductive technology.
HFE Act of 2008 recently liberalized that policy by omitting the words “including the need of that child for a father” after legislators decided that the requirement discriminated against single mothers and lesbians, however the
“duty . . . to consider the welfare of the child who may be born as a result of
treatment . . . or any other child who may be affected,” has been retained.
Rachael Dobson, UK Parliament Rejects the ‘Need for a Father’ in IVF Treatment, PROGRESS EDUC. TRUST, June 3, 2008, available at http://www.ivf.net/
ivf/uk-parliament-rejects-the-need-for-a-father-in-ivf-treatment-o3427.html.
25. At the present moment these bills do not seem to be moving forward.
See, e.g., Judith F. Daar, Accessing Reproductive Technologies: Invisible Barriers, Indelible Harms, 23 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 18, 44 –46 (2008)
(citing H.B. 187, 2006 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2006)); Mary Beth
Schneider, Assisted-Reproduction Bill Dropped, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Oct. 6,
2005, at B2. U.S. states achieve similar ends through more subtle means such
as limiting the enforceability of surrogacy agreements to cases where the
commissioning couple is legally married, limiting insurance mandates covering IVF to cases of married heterosexual individuals, and absolving sperm donors of legal parenthood responsibilities only when the recipient is married.
E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.15(1) (West 2010); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 160.754( b) (West 2008); JESSICA ARONS, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, FUTURE
CHOICES: ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AND THE LAW 8 (2007),
available at www.americanprogress.org/issues/2007/12/pdf/arons_art.pdf; Cohen & Chen, supra note 12, at 539; Daar, supra, at 46; John A. Robertson, Gay
and Lesbian Access to Assisted Reproductive Technology, 55 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 323, 356 (2004).
26. Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Oocyte Donation to Postmenopausal Women, 67 FERTILITY & STERILITY 2S–3S (1997).
27. Michelle Cretella & Den Trumbull, Homosexual Parenting: Is It Time
For Change?, AM. C. PEDIATRICIANS, http://www.acpeds.org/homosexual
-parenting-is-it-time-for-change.html ( last updated Jan. 2012).
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Scholars arguing on both sides of the issue have also settled on BIRC as the proper idiom in which to debate these restrictions. For example, Radhika Rao suggests that “[t]he government could limit the use of ARTs in order to prevent
physical, psychological, or social harms to the participants or
28
the resulting children” as it does in adoption, and admits that
deficits to a child in being raised in a single or LGBT household
could constitute such harm (although she doubts this claim’s
29
empirical bona fides). On the other side, Lynn Wardle claims
that unmarried and LGBT individuals’ use of reproductive
technologies harms children by “depriving a child of contact
30
with one of his or her parents.”
Parental Fitness Screening: Other scholars have proposed requiring parental fitness screening for reproductive
technology, akin to that which occurs in child adoption, premised on BIRC concerns. For example, Debora Spar, now Dean of
Columbia University’s Barnard College, notes that the best interests rationale controlling adoption “could easily be extended
into the realm of assisted reproduction, even if only to scrutinize procedures that are known to carry extensive risks to the
31
child . . . .” Similarly, Marsha Garrison has argued that
“[l]ogically, if regulation of adoption is constitutionally permissible to safeguard the interests of the adoptive child, her biological parents, and would-be adoptive parents, so is regulation of
reproductive technology aimed at protecting the various actors
32
involved and any children that might be produced.” She endorses reproductive technology regulation justified by “child-

28. Radhika Rao, Equal Liberty: Assisted Reproductive Technology and
Reproductive Equality, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1457, 1479 (2008).
29. Id. at 1476–77; see also NAOMI R. CAHN, TEST TUBE FAMILIES: WHY
THE FERTILITY MARKET NEEDS LEGAL REGULATION 168 (2009) (summarizing
the conservative argument that the law should “encourage two parents, one of
each sex, for every child”).
30. Lynn D. Wardle, Global Perspective on Procreation and Parentage by
Assisted Reproduction, 35 CAP. U. L. REV. 413, 444 –51 (2006); see also Camille
S. Williams, Planned Parent-Deprivation: Not in the Best Interests of the Child,
4 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 375, 376 (2005) (“[G]iven the importance
of shared familial history and kinship to individual identity, and the importance of both maternal and paternal involvement in the development of
children, intentionally depriving a child of one parent will surely wound the
child in a multitude of ways.”).
31. Debora L. Spar, As You Like It: Exploring the Limits of Parental
Choice in Assisted Reproduction, 27 LAW & INEQ. 481, 491 (2009).
32. Marsha Garrison, Regulating Reproduction, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1623, 1627 (2008).
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33

protection aims.” These recommendations have some uptake
in regulations in the Netherlands and the Australian state of
Victoria requiring criminal background checks as a precondition for IVF usage and screening out those who exhibit psycho34
pathologies. In the United States, the American Society for
Reproductive Medicine recommends screening out those with
uncontrolled psychiatric illness, a history of child or spousal
35
abuse, or drug abuse, and survey data of ART clinics in the
U.S. suggests that these screening recommendations have often
36
been adopted.
Anonymous Sperm Donation: Austria, Germany, Switzerland, the Australian states of Victoria and Western Australia, the Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland have all banned anonymous sperm donation, in many
cases relying on concerns about the welfare of children born
without access to their father’s identity—that is, a BIRC rea37
son. Scholars considering the question like Mary Lyndon
33. Id. at 1642; see also Marsha Garrison, Law Making for Baby Making:
An Interpretive Approach to the Determination of Legal Parentage, 113 HARV.
L. REV. 835, 854 –59 (2000).
34. See J.A.M. Hunfeld et al., Protect the Child from Being Born: Arguments Against IVF from Heads of the 13 Licensed Dutch Fertility Centres, Ethical and Legal Perspectives, 22 J. REPROD. & INFANT PSYCHOL. 279, 280–88
(2004) (examining arguments in the Netherlands for withholding IVF treatment from special patient groups); Richard F. Storrow, The Bioethics of Prospective Parenthood: In Pursuit of the Proper Standard for Gatekeeping in Infertility Clinics, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2283, 2291 (2007) (discussing IVF laws in
the Netherlands); Mixed Response to Victoria’s Law Change, ABC NEWS (Dec.
5, 2008, 5:44 PM), http://www.abc.net.au/news/2008-12-05/mixed-response-to
-victorias-ivf-law-changes/230976 (reporting on Victoria’s background-check
requirement); see also Daar, supra note 25, at 67 (“Basing a physician’s ability
to deny ART services on his or her prediction about the child-rearing abilities
of a prospective parent is speculative and leaves too much opportunity for
masking pure discrimination with concern for offspring.”); Ethics Comm. of
the Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., Child-Rearing Ability and the Provision of
Fertility Services, 82 FERTILITY & STERILITY 564, 565 (2004) (arguing that fertility programs should be permitted to deny fertility services when there is a
“substantial basis for such judgments”); Judy E. Stern et al., Access to Services
at Assisted Reproductive Technology Clinics: A Survey of Policies and Practices, 184 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 591, 596 (2001) (discussing the policy of some clinics to deny access to patients they think would make problematic parents).
35. Ethics Comm. of the Am. Soc’y for Reprod. Med., supra note 34, at 567.
36. See Andrea D. Gurmankin et al., Screening Practices and Beliefs of
Assisted Reproductive Technology Programs, 83 FERTILITY & STERILITY 61,
61–65 (2005).
37. See Human Assisted Reproductive Technology Act of 2004 § 4(a), (e)
(N.Z.); Ken Daniels & Alison Douglass, Access to Genetic Information by Donor
Offspring and Donors: Medicine, Policy and Law in New Zealand, 27 MED. &
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Shanley, Ellen Waldman, and Naomi Cahn have similarly fo38
cused on a BIRC analysis of donor anonymity.
Sperm/Egg Donor and Surrogate Compensation:
Britain, Canada and the Australian states of Victoria and New
South Wales have banned or limited compensation for egg and
39
sperm donation beyond expenses incurred. Canada, the Australian states of Victoria and Western Australia have made
commercial surrogacy a crime, as have the U.S. states of New
40
York, Michigan, Washington, and the District of Columbia.
Great Britain de facto prohibits commercial surrogacy by forbidding the transfer of parentage rights from the surrogate to
the intended parents absent “a showing before the court that
the surrogate received no financial or other beneficial considerL. 131, 134 (2008); Christopher De Jonge & Christopher L. R. Barratt, Gamete
Donation: A Question of Anonymity, 85 FERTILITY & STERILITY 500, 500
(2006); Michelle Dennison, Revealing Your Sources: The Case For NonAnonymous Gamete Donation, 21 J.L. & HEALTH 1, 8–10 (2008); Lucy Frith,
Gamete Donation and Anonymity: The Ethical and Legal Debate, 16 HUM.
REPROD. 818, 818–20 (2001); Ilke Turkmendag et al., The Removal of Donor
Anonymity in the UK: The Silencing of Claims by Would-Be Parents, 22 INT’L
J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 283, 283–84 (2008); Can You Be Anonymous as a Sperm,
Egg or Embryo Donor?, HUM. FERTILISATION & EMBRYOLOGY AUTHORITY,
http://www.hfea.gov.uk/1973.html ( last visited Jan. 22, 2012).
38. See, e.g., Katharine K. Baker, Bionormativity and the Construction of
Parenthood, 42 GA. L. REV. 649, 682–88 (2008); Cahn, supra note 17, at 73–74;
Mary Lyndon Shanley, Collaboration and Commodification in Assisted Procreation: Reflections on an Open Market and Anonymous Donation in Human
Sperm and Eggs, 36 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 257, 268 (2002); Ellen Waldman, What
Do We Tell the Children, 35 CAP. U. L. REV. 517, 520–32, 533–55 (2006). Of
course, the term “donation” is a bit of a misnomer since in almost all instances
the individuals are paid. Still, I use “donation” because it is the more common
term.
39. See Prohibition of Human Cloning Act 2002 (Cth) s 23 (Austl.); Assisted Human Reproduction Act, S.C. 2004, c. 2, § 7(1) (Can.); HUMAN FERTILISATION & EMBRYOLOGY AUTH., SPERM, EGG AND EMBRYO DONATION (SEED) REPORT 14 (2005) (UK), available at http://www.hfea.gov.uk/docs/SEEDR
eport05.pdf; Michelle Bercovici, Biotechnology Beyond the Embryo: Science,
Ethics, and Responsible Regulation of Egg Donation to Protect Women’s
Rights, 29 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 193, 205–06 (2008); Press Release, Human
Fertilisation & Embryology Auth., HFEA Confirms UK Position on Payment
for Egg Donors (Feb. 25, 2004), available at http://www.hfea.gov.uk/784.html.
40. See D.C. CODE §§ 16-401 to -402 (LexisNexis 2001) ( punishing both
commercial and altruistic surrogacy); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.859
(West 2002); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 123(1) (McKinney 1999); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 26.26.210–.260 (West 2005); Infertility Treatment Act 1995 (Vic)
s 59 (Austl.); Surrogacy Act 2008 (W. Austl.) pt 2 div 2 ss 8–9 (Austl.); Assisted
Human Reproduction Act, S.C. 2004, c. 2, § 6(1) (Can.); Ailis L. Burpee, Note,
Momma Drama: A Study of How Canada’s National Regulation of Surrogacy
Compares to Australia’s Independent State Regulation of Surrogacy, 37 GA. J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 305, 310–20 (2009).
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ation in exchange for her services as a surrogate . . . .” The
U.S. states of Louisiana, Maryland, Nebraska, New Mexico and
42
Oregon render commercial surrogacy contracts unenforceable.
Although much of the literature on prohibiting (or limiting)
compensation for egg (and, much less frequently, sperm) donation focuses on concerns relating to what I have elsewhere
termed coercion—the voluntariness of the decision to participate due to monetary inducement, a form of Legal Paternalism
justification under Part I’s taxonomy—and corruption argu43
ments focused on commodification, a number of authors such
as Martha Ertman, Elizabeth Anderson, and Kenneth Baum,
have considered BIRC justifications relating to harm to chil44
dren from being “purchased.”
Enforcement of Surrogacy Agreements: In a similar
45
vein, both courts (most famously in Baby M and Johnson v.
46
47
Calvert ) and scholars such as Richard Epstein have consid41. Ruby L. Lee, New Trends in Global Outsourcing of Commercial Surrogacy: A Call for Regulation, 20 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 275, 287 (2009); see
also HUMAN FERTILISATION & EMBRYOLOGY AUTH., supra note 39.
42. See Darra L. Hofman, “Mama’s Baby, Daddy’s Maybe:” A State-byState Survey of Surrogacy Laws and Their Disparate Gender Impact, 35 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 449, 456–59 (2009).
43. Note, The Price of Everything, the Value of Nothing: Reframing the
Commodification Debate, 117 HARV. L. REV. 689, 689–90 (2003). I discuss these corruption arguments below under the rubric of Legal Moralism. See infra
Part IV.A.
44. Martha M. Ertman, What’s Wrong With a Parenthood Market? A New
and Improved Theory of Commodification, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1, 33 (2003); see also, e.g., Elizabeth S. Anderson, Is Women’s Labor a Commodity, 19 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 71, 75–77 (1990); Kenneth Baum, Golden Eggs: Towards the Rational Regulation of Oocyte Donation, 2001 BYU L. REV. 107, 156.
45. In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1248 (N.J. 1988) (“Worst of all, however,
is the contract’s total disregard of the best interests of the child” in that
“[t]here is not the slightest suggestion that any inquiry will be made at any
time to determine the fitness of the Sterns as custodial parents, of Mrs. Stern
as an adoptive parent, their superiority to Mrs. Whitehead, or the effect on the
child of not living with her natural mother”).
46. 851 P.2d 776, 783 (Cal. 1993) (“[A]s Professor Shultz recognizes, the
interests of children, particularly at the outset of their lives, are ‘[un]likely to
run contrary to those of adults who choose to bring them into being.’ Thus,
‘[h]onoring the plans and expectations of adults who will be responsible for a
child’s welfare is likely to correlate significantly with positive outcomes for
parents and children alike.’” (quoting Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive
Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 297, 397)); id. at 799–800 (Panelli, J., dissenting) (arguing that prior contractual agreements as to surrogacy should be ignored and
parentage determined purely by inquiry as to which potential parent would
serve the best interests of the children).
47. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Surrogacy: The Case For Full Contractu-

2012]

BEYOND BEST INTERESTS

1203

ered the potential harm to children from being the subject of an
enforceable surrogacy agreement as a potential reason not to
enforce those agreements, while statutes in several state mandate an adoption-style parental fitness evaluation of potential
surrogates based on best-interests concerns before surrogacy
48
agreements will be enforced. To be sure, the BIRC strand of
reasoning does not dominate this discourse, but instead is usu49
ally offered alongside paternalistic arguments.

al Enforcement, 81 VA. L. REV. 2305, 2321 (1995); see also Vanessa S. BrowneBarbour, Bartering For Babies: Are Preconception Agreements in the Best Interests of Children?, 26 WHITTIER L. REV. 429, 484 (2004) (arguing that preconception arrangements “constitute baby selling and should be prohibited”
due to concern for the welfare of the resulting children).
48. See, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:16 to 18 (LexisNexis 2010);
UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, § 803( b)(2) (2000) (amended 2002) (requiring that for
judicial pre-approval of a surrogacy agreement, inter alia, “unless waived by
the court, the [relevant child-welfare agency] has made a home study of the
intended parents and the intended parents meet the standards of suitability
applicable to adoptive parents.” (alteration in original)).
49. Legal Paternalism in the regulation of reproduction is the view that
the State can justifiably intervene in an individual’s reproductive decisions in
order to protect that same individual. In this instance, the State knows what
is better for the individual than the individual does. Typically, such arguments portray the individual as suffering from bounded rationality or false
consciousness, and he will actually be ‘harmed’ if allowed to pursue his desired
path.
While I have analyzed this form of justification elsewhere in my work on
reproduction, see, e.g., Cohen, supra note 15, at 1161–96, I largely put it to one
side here for a few reasons. First, unlike BIRC itself and most of the justificatory idioms I discuss (Legal Moralism may actually share this feature), its application is largely distinct from concerns about child welfare. Legal Paternalism may justify intervening in reproductive decisions that produce children
with very high welfare, and it may leave untouched reproductive behavior that
produces children with very low welfare. In other words, unlike the other
views I canvas, Legal Paternalism does not present itself as a true BIRCsubstitute and is instead often a separate kind of justification. Second, for related reasons, Legal Paternalism seems to me plausible only in a few of the
examples of reproductive regulations I have discussed above—abstinence education and surrogacy contracting in particular—but unlike a justification such
as Reproductive Externalities it has less general application. Finally, while my
views sometimes skew in a libertarian direction, I do not believe that the State
is always forbidden as a matter of principle from regulating on Legal Paternalism grounds. Instead, I believe that such regulation demands careful case-bycase analysis of the underlying behavioral law and economics data, and the
costs and benefits of regulation. See Cohen, Protecting Patients with Passports:
Medical Tourism and the Patient-Protective Argument, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1467,
1523–59 (2010); Cohen, supra note 15, at 1161–96. Thus, if I have succeeded
in this Article on casting doubt on many of the justifications one could offer for
regulating reproduction, Legal Paternalism remains unscathed here, but subject to case-by-case scrutiny going forward.

1204

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[96:1187

2. The Attraction of BIRC Justifications and the Family
Privacy Analogy
As the mapping in the prior section suggests, the BIRC
form of justification for regulation of reproduction focuses on a
Millian Harm Principle and applies it to a particularly vulnerable group—children who result from reproduction. From a political theory perspective, this idiom is a very attractive way to
justify state interference with reproductive decision-making because that interference is supposedly justified by preventing
50
harm to society’s most vulnerable—children. Harm Principle
arguments are typically accepted even by libertarians as a
proper justification for liberty-limiting government regulation,
51
including criminal sanctions. Further, with harm to children
arguments there are no issues of consent or contributory fault,
and as a matter of human psychology, the suffering of children
is a particularly potent call for action. Thus, BIRC is an attractive justificatory idiom because it relies on relatively uncontroversial premises that permit an overlapping consensus between
otherwise divergent comprehensive moral theories, such as
52
welfarism, libertarianism, etc.

50. To be precise, in some usages what is called “best interests” actually
exceeds that which is prohibited by the Harm Principle. Richard Storrow has
captured a similar point nicely, explaining that “although exposing children to
serious harm is of necessity inconsistent with their best interests, what is not
best for a child does not necessarily harm the child.” Storrow, supra note 34, at
2300–01. Are the types of cases I discuss in this Article harm-prevention or
benefit-conferral? To ask the question demonstrates the baseline problem we
face, a point I return to in discussing enhancement below. Nevertheless, because my goal is to defeat the application of best interests reasoning in this
context, I want to be as generous as possible to my interlocutor. Therefore, for
present purposes I will grant that all interventions justified on BIRC reasoning that I discuss can benefit from the political theoretical cover of the Harm
Principle, even though I think the point is arguable. As a terminological matter it might be more precise to describe the Harm Principle as a commitment
to the view that harm to others is the only basis for justifying the State’s ability to limit liberty, but in what follows I will write more loosely about going
“beyond” the Harm Principle versus sticking to it.
51. See, e.g., MILL, supra note 13, at 91.
52. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 144 (expanded ed.
2005). Of course, even the command “protect children from harm” may not
forge a complete overlapping consensus in that it may require subscription to
particular concepts of what constitutes “harm,” for example whether being
born deaf harms a child or instead enables them to be a participant in deaf
culture. See I. Glenn Cohen, Intentional Diminishment, the Non-Identity Problem, and Legal Liability, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 347, 349–50 (2008). But the BIRCapproach, if it were valid, would certainly be able to forge much more of an
overlapping consensus than many of the views I canvass below.
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BIRC is also an attractive justificatory idiom because it can
draw on a parallel idiom in family law as to the importance of
Best Interests of Existing Children, one of the central organizing principles of family law. Although it is sometimes called
child welfare or harm prevention, I will just use Best Interests
from here on out. This idiom has origins in the United States
53
going back to at least the 1830s. For example, in determining
child custody in a divorce proceeding, many states suggest that
the best interest of the child is to be considered, with thirty-five
54
states listing the welfare of the child as the sole consideration.
Many state statutes have a presumption that the legal parent
will have visitation rights with the child even when they are
the noncustodial parent but that the court may terminate those
rights on a showing that the child’s welfare would be seriously
55
endangered. In adoption, the state investigates potential
adopters, qualifying some and disqualifying others, to ensure
that allowing the adoptive parents to become the parents of the
56
child is in the child’s best interests. Despite constitutional law
protecting parents’ right to raise their child in their faith, religiously motivated refusal of needed treatment for the child will
be overruled when the activity endangers a child’s life, and in
57
some jurisdictions if it endangers the child’s health as well.
In these and other family law settings’ the central model is
the same: “[t]he state appropriately steps in, as parens patriae
protector of the welfare of these non-autonomous persons, to
act in their behalf, choosing for them” when their welfare is
58
threatened by parental action. From a political theory per53. See, e.g., DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS ET AL., CONTEMPORARY FAMILY LAW
653 (2006) (citing MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND
THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 241 (1985)); Lynne Marie
Kohm, Tracing the Foundations of the Best Interests of the Child Standard in
American Jurisprudence, 10 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 337, 347–50 (2008).
54. See James G. Dwyer, A Taxonomy of Children’s Existing Rights in
State Decision Making About Their Relationships, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
845, 907–11 (2003) (collecting statutes).
55. Id. at 932–34 nn.253–54 (collecting statutes).
56. See, e.g., ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 9-308( b) (2002); see also
Dwyer, supra note 54, at 881–904 (surveying existing adoption law by state).
57. See Kei Robert Hirasawa, Note, Are Parents Acting in the Best Interests of Their Children When They Make Medical Decisions Based on Their Religious Beliefs?, 44 FAM. CT. REV. 316, 317–24 (2006) (collecting cases and histories); Laura M. Plastine, Comment, “In God We Trust”: When Parents Refuse
Medical Treatment for Their Children Based Upon Their Sincere Religious Beliefs, 3 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 123, 142 & n.79 (1993).
58. James G. Dwyer, The Child Protection Pretense: States’ Continued Consignment of Newborn Babies to Unfit Parents, 93 MINN. L. REV. 407, 411 (2008).
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spective, the best interests justification is a very powerful one,
overruling what would otherwise be a forbidden state intrusion
into the private realm of family decision-making.
One way of understanding the prominence of BIRC justifications for the regulation of reproduction, then, is as transposition of reasoning from family law into the law of reproduction.
The analogy goes: protecting the best interests of existing children is to the constitutional protections against interference in
child rearing and legal parenthood (family autonomy) as protecting the best interests of resulting children is to the constitutional protections against interference in reproductive decisions (reproductive autonomy). Both are constitutionally
protected spheres where the state is usually restrained from interfering, but where such interference is nevertheless justified
59
in order to protect child welfare.
To be a little more precise, on the existing child side, Su60
preme Court decisions like Meyer v. Nebraska, Pierce v. Socie61
62
ty of Sisters, Prince v. Massachusetts, and Wisconsin v.
63
Yoder all recognize a broad family autonomy principle protecting parents’ child-rearing decisions but also the need to subordinate family privacy when there are serious threats to child
welfare. They offer though two different strands supporting
this principle. The predominant strand ties it to child vulnerability: children are at the mercy of the parents, walled off from
the assistance of any other agents of protection and socializa64
tion but for State intervention. This strand connects the protection of children to the protection of other vulnerable populations such as mentally incompetent adults, with the State
65
stepping in as parens patriae. The second, more subordinate
59. Cf. Dov Fox, The Illiberality of ‘Liberal Eugenics’, 20 RATIO 1, 5 (2007)
(summarizing the argument that the discretion afforded to parents to shape
their existing offspring through praise, blame, and other means ought to extend to genetic manipulation).
60. 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923).
61. 268 U.S. 510, 534 –35 (1925).
62. 321 U.S. 158, 165–66 (1944).
63. 406 U.S. 205, 221–22, 230–34 (1972).
64. See, e.g., Helen M. Alvaré, Gonzales v. Carhart: Bringing Abortion
Law Back Into the Family Law Fold, 69 MONT. L. REV. 409, 415–16 (2008) (arguing this jurisprudence reflects the Lockean premise that “children are selfevidently vulnerable, particularly relative to adults, and require special solicitude and protection” and that “[ p]arents have the first duty and first right to
shield their vulnerable children; if they fail, the state may intervene on the
children’s behalf ”).
65. Dwyer, supra note 58.
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strand treats protecting child welfare as instrumentally good in
ensuring future citizens capable of participating in a democratic society. We can call these two the vulnerability and social
planning strands, respectively.
Once the social planning strand is excavated from the opinions, we can also see the Court’s attempt to set some limits:
Meyer notes that the State would exceed its power if it tried to
enact the vision of the Ideal Commonwealth from Plato’s Republic—where all children are reared collectively, no child
knowing which is his or her parent and no parent knowing
which is his or her child, and society invests in the children of
“good parents,” while “the offspring of the inferior, or of the better when they chance to be deformed” are hidden away—or the
practice in ancient Sparta of assembling boys at age seven and
entrusting their subsequent education and training to official
guardians rather than parents, opining that no “[l]egislature
could impose such restrictions upon the people of a state without doing violence to both letter and spirit of the Constitu66
tion.” Yoder distinguishes Prince by arguing that unlike that
case or prior decisions, this was not a circumstance “in which
any harm to the physical or mental health of the child or to the
public safety, peace, order, or welfare has been demonstrated or
67
may be properly inferred.” The Court notes that “the power of
the parent, even when linked to a free exercise claim, may be
subject to limitation under Prince if it appears that parental
decisions will jeopardize the health or safety of the child, or
68
have a potential for significant social burdens.”
As to existing children, the vulnerability and social planning strands operate largely in tandem in that the State intervenes to protect children from, for example, an abusive home
environment because the child is vulnerable and because failure to do so will result in a child who cannot appropriately carry the mantle of citizen. In the realm of regulating reproduc66. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,401–02 (1923). Although the opinion
does not cite The Republic, the episode and the quotations can be found in
PLATO, THE REPUBLIC bk. 5, at 457–60.
67. 406 U.S. at 230; see also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68 (2000)
(recognizing that while the state can interfere to protect best interests, there
is a “presumption that fit parents act in the best interests of their children”);
Prince, 321 U.S. at 173, 175 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (accepting that “shielding
minors from the evil vicissitudes of early life” is important, but finding that
the state’s failure to show the “bare possibility that such harms might” occur
to the child in this circumstance was insufficient).
68. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 233–34 (emphasis added).
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tion, however, the two strands pull apart conceptually. I argue
in Part II that the Reproductive Externalities approach is
grounded in this social planning strand, but that much of the
discourse regarding regulating reproduction masks that strand
by problematically using the language of best interests.
C. THE PROBLEM WITH BIRC
As I have said, there is a logical problem with attempts to
have best interests reasoning play a limiting role in reproductive autonomy analogous to its role limiting family autonomy.
The problem is that in the latter context there is an appeal to
the best interest of the existing child while in the reproductive
context the appeal is actually to best interest of the resulting
child. Whenever the proposed intervention will itself determine
whether a particular child will come into existence, best interest arguments premised on that child’s welfare are problematic.
This point is at the core of the “Non-Identity Problem” developed by Derek Parfit, a problem that has been the subject of
a great deal of philosophical attention since the publication of
69
Parfit’s Reasons and Persons in 1984. The punch line of the
problem is that we cannot be said to harm children by creating
70
them as long as we do not give them a life not worth living. A
life not worth living is a life so full of pain and suffering, and so
devoid of anything good, that the individual would prefer never
to have come into existence. As I have demonstrated in Regulating Reproduction, this insight renders problematic any attempt to use BIRC reasons to justify a regulation of reproduction that will alter when, whether, or with whom individuals
reproduce—such a regulation cannot be said to be in the best
interests of the resulting child because a different child will
71
result.

69. DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS 358–59 (rev. ed. 1987); see,
e.g., ALLEN BUCHANAN ET AL., FROM CHANCE TO CHOICE: GENETICS AND JUSTICE 224 –25 (2000); Dan W. Brock, The Nonidentity Problem and Genetic
Harms—The Case of Wrongful Handicaps, 9 BIOETHICS 269 (1995). For an indepth treatment in the context of access to reproductive technologies, see John
A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and Harm to Offspring in Assisted Reproduction, 30 AM. J.L. & MED. 7 (2004). For my own discussion of the problem in the
context of tort liability for intentionally creating children with disabilities, see
generally Cohen, supra note 52 (arguing to bar tort liability for creating disabled children when it is done by selection).
70. See BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 69, at 233; JOEL FEINBERG, HARM
TO OTHERS 98–104 (1984); Shiffrin, supra note 6, at 118.
71. Cohen, supra note 5, at 457.
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The easiest version of the problem to see involves regulation of whether individuals reproduce, for example, the denials
of access to reproductive technology to LGBT, aged, or single
parents. Imagine that sixty-year-old Ethel wants to have a baby through reproductive technology and assume arguendo that
this child, Maxwell, will be worse off (physiologically, psychologically, etc.) than would the average child born to a woman in
her twenties. We cannot say that a state law preventing Ethel’s
access to reproductive technology at her age furthers the welfare of Maxwell, because if the State blocks that access Maxwell will never exist and, so long as he has a life worth living,
coming into existence does not harm him. Thus, any state intervention influencing whether individuals reproduce (absent
72
lives not worth living) cannot be justified by BIRC reasoning.
A similar problem extends to attempts to influence when
and with whom individuals reproduce. Parfit’s primary discussion of this problem in Reasons and Persons is that of a fourteen-year-old girl who has a child and gives it a bad start in life
by not waiting to have a child until she is older. As he notes,
“We cannot claim that this girl’s decision was worse for her
child. What is the objection to her decision? This question arises because, in the different outcomes, different people would be
73
born.” Thus, here too the usual (what Parfit calls personaffecting) conception of harm assumed by the BIRC argument
cannot be the basis for justifying attempts to alter when individuals reproduce—such as state funding of teenage abstinence
programs or implanting of Norplant or other temporary forms
of birth control in women convicted of multiple counts of drug
74
possession. A similar logic applies to interventions regulating
72. From here on I stop repeating the proviso “absent lives not worth living” but intend it to be implied throughout.
73. PARFIT, supra note 69, at 359.
74. To be clear, in the cases I am discussing in this Article, the delay has
to be one as to when sperm and egg meet. Compare that to a different delay: a
husband and wife fertilize pre-embryos as part of IVF at Time 1, but choose to
implant the pre-embryo either at Time 1 + 1 year, or after cryopreservation at
Time 1 + 5 years. In many of my examples, the regulation influencing when
and with whom we reproduce will also change other facets of an individual’s
life—like the date on which he or she is born or who his or her rearing parents
are—that might also be thought to alter identity in the relevant sense. While I
do not think these additional facts are necessary to produce a Non-Identity
Problem (i.e., it is enough for a different sperm-egg combination to occur), I
leave open the question of whether they might nonetheless be sufficient to do
so in some cases even if the same sperm meets the same egg. If they were sufficient, a still-wider swath of the regulation of reproduction might be subject to
the Non-Identity Problem, for example, rules regarding the enforcement of
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with whom individuals reproduce, for example, the criminalization of adult brother-sister (or first cousin-first cousin) incest in
the United States and many foreign countries.
At this juncture it is worth clarifying that none of this depends on any assumption that children are harmed if they are
not brought into existence. Instead, I share with others the
view that “no one is harmed in not being created, because there
75
is no one to be harmed if we do not create someone.” Thus, accepting this insight in no way implies a conclusion that parents
do wrong by failing to have the largest number of children they
can or that they harm a particular child by failing to create the
76
child. All it entails is that no one is harmed by being created if
77
he or she is given a life worth living. I emphasize this point,
because it is common source of confusion.
In one respect, the whether case is an easier one for ruling
out BIRC justifications than the with whom case, and especially the when case, because in these latter cases the claim depends on the assumption that changing which sperm meets
which egg—that is changing which child, genetically speaking,
is conceived—is sufficient to produce a Non-Identity Problem
that rules out BIRC justifications. This is a relatively weak assumption. It does not require subscription to a strong form of
genetic essentialism—the view that your genes determine who
you are—but is instead entirely compatible with the view that
given a certain complement of genes you could become any
number of different kinds of people from the point of view of
78
what philosophers sometimes call narrative identity. Genetic
identity does not ensure narrative identity—identical twins
share the same genes but are different people. Thus, it is also
not a claim about identity and lack thereof in all senses of the
word. It is the weak claim that if we want to know whether the
person that results from the particular sperm and egg combination would be harmed, we cannot say that it would further the
pre-embryo disposition agreements that may alter when pre-embryos are implanted. See generally Cohen, supra note 49.
75. F.M. Kamm, Cloning and Harm to Offspring, 4 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. &
PUB. POL’Y 65, 72 (2000–2001).
76. It is at least possible that this conclusion may be entailed by one of the
competitor views to BIRC as a justification of regulating reproduction, the
non-person-affecting principle approach. Cohen, supra note 5, at 481–513.
77. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
78. David Shoemaker, Personal Identity and Ethics, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Edward N. Zalta et al. eds., rev. ed. Mar. 5, 2008), http://
plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-ethics/.
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welfare of that person if we instead substituted a different
sperm and egg combination. Philosophers often refer to this as
“numerical identity”; two entities are not the same because
79
there are two of them.
To put it tangibly: my mother was married once, without
children, before she had me with her second husband. Imagine
we concluded (counterfactually I hope!) that on the day of my
conception she had instead conceived with her first husband;
the resulting child—call him Gabriel—would have been healthier or in other ways had a better life than I did. All the NonIdentity Problem requires accepting is that if we want to know
whether my life harms me (i.e., is Glenn harmed by being alive)
it would be wrong to compare Glenn’s life to the life Gabriel
would have lived. That comparison might be relevant for some
other purposes—indeed the non-person-affecting principle approach I discuss in Part III focuses on it—but is not relevant to
the question of whether Glenn has been harmed by being born.
I believe Parfit is right on this issue of alterations of when or
with whom we reproduce, and in what follows I will examine
80
the consequences for the law.
I have also purposefully restricted my canvas in this Article to cases where the State seeks to influence who will be conceived, not who will be born, to bracket (for present purposes)
three additional more controversial questions. The first question concerns whether Non-Identity Problems can result from
genetic manipulations of early embryos, and which kinds of
manipulations—an issue I have discussed in other work concerning tort liability for parents who use reproductive technol79. Harold Noonan, Identity, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL. (Edward N. Zalta et al. eds., rev. ed. Nov. 7, 2009), available at http://plato
.stanford.edu/archives/win2009/entries/identity/ (“To say that things are identical is to say that they are the same. ‘Identity’ and ‘sameness’ mean the same;
their meanings are identical. However, they have more than one meaning. A
distinction is customarily drawn between qualitative and numerical identity or
sameness. Things with qualitative identity share properties, so things can be
more or less qualitatively identical. Poodles and Great Danes are qualitatively
identical because they share the property of being a dog, and such properties
as go along with that, but two poodles will (very likely) have greater qualitative identity. Numerical identity requires absolute, or total, qualitative identity, and can only hold between a thing and itself.”).
80. For those who remain unpersuaded, my analysis of regulations on
“whether” individuals can reproduce that cover many of the interventions discussed above should still matter, since it does not rely on this tie between
genes and identity. See Cohen, supra note 5, at 445–71. How the Non-Identity
Problem interfaces with religious views of ensoulment I leave to religious
scholars and self-consciously do not address here.
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ogies to purposefully create children with disabilities; these
cases raise the further question of whether genetic manipulations rather than changing conception can give rise to Non81
Identity Problems. The second question concerns the interplay
between Non-Identity Problems and the abortion right, a case I
believe requires a quite different analysis: On the one hand,
while no one is harmed if not conceived, on some views of fetal
personhood the fetus may be harmed if aborted, creating a divergence from my cases. On the other hand, for some writers
that defend the abortion right as a right not to be a gestational
parent that is tied to bodily integrity, that right exists irrespective of fetal person such that this divergence may be irrele82
vant. Thus, my analysis here does not necessarily cut in any
direction on the abortion debate, except to render more problematic a small strand of reasoning occasionally presented that
parallels BIRC by defending the abortion right on the basis of
83
harm to children of growing up unwanted or out-of-wedlock.
The third question relates to regulation of multiple gestation,
84
made (in)famous by the “Octomom” news coverage. There are
many complications here—indeed one might conclude that
some of the multiple gestating pre-embryos are harmed while
85
others are not —but for this Article I stick to simpler cases,
81. In a symposium issue in which we participated, Kirsten Smolensky
argued that such manipulations never can create Non-Identity Problems,
Kirsten Smolensky, Creating Children With Disabilities: Parental Tort Liability for Preimplantation Genetic Interventions, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 299, 331–36
(2008), while I have argued against that conclusion, Cohen, supra note 52, at
350–59.
82. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 15, at 1132; Judith Jarvis Thomson, A Defense of Abortion, 1 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 47, 48–49 (1971) (grounding a defense of
abortion in the thought experiment of waking up one morning to find a worldfamous violinist connected to your vital organs without your
permission).
83. That strand is one way to read the passage in Roe v. Wade noting that
“[t]here is also the distress, for all concerned, associated with the unwanted
child, and there is the problem of bringing a child into a family already unable,
psychologically and otherwise, to care for it.” 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
84. See, e.g., Camille M. Davidson, Octomom and Multi-Fetal Pregnancies:
Why Federal Legislation Should Require Insurers to Cover In Vitro Fertilization, 17 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 135, 137–38 (2010).
85. To hum only the first few bars of a very complex set of questions: first
imagine a woman is deciding how many of six pre-embryos to implant at once.
If we knew that the prevailing legal rule would cause her to implant all six at
once or each of the six seriatim, one might not think there is a Non-Identity
Problem since the same six (genetically speaking) children will come into existence, the only question is whether they will suffer the deficits of womb sharing or not. Even this conclusion will depend on the issue alluded to above, su-
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which as we will see are not nearly as simple as they might
appear.
At this juncture some readers might react: “That is philosophically fascinating, but it seems like an interesting puzzle
that would never motivate judges or other legal actors.” To the
contrary, the Non-Identity Problem insight has been implicitly
accepted by the vast majority of courts that have rejected
wrongful life tort liability for similar reasons. To give but one
example, in Siemieniec v. Lutheran General Hospital, the Illinois Supreme Court rejected the child’s ability to bring a
wrongful life suit because it was “reluctant to find that the infant has suffered a legally cognizable injury by being born with
a congenital or genetic impairment as opposed to not being
born at all” and
[r]ecognition of a cause of action for wrongful life in this case
would therefore require this court to find [the child] had an interest in
avoiding his own birth, i.e., that there is a fundamental legal right not
86
to be born when birth would necessarily entail a life of hardship
87

which the Siemieniec court was not prepared to do.

pra note 74, of whether changes in sperm-egg combination are only sufficient
or actually necessary to produce a Non-Identity Problem. Contrast this with a
case where the legal rules adopted to regulate multiple gestation will cause
the prospective mother to either implant all six pre-embryos at once, or only
implant two pre-embryos seriatim (due to cost or some other reason). Now
there is no Non-Identity Problem as to the two that would have been implanted either way, but there may be a Non-Identity Problem as to the four whose
implantation depends on the prevailing legal rule. Actually, on some views
about whether fertilized pre-embryos are harmed by not being implanted, the
answer here might depend on whether the prevailing legal rule alters how
many pre-embryos are implanted versus how many are fertilized to begin
with. Finally, contrast these two cases with still another case where multiple
gestation occurs due to the use of a fertility drug, and but-for the use of the
fertility drug all the fetuses that come into being would be the result of different sperm-egg combinations. Here it seems as though the Non-Identity Problem affects all of the fetuses and thus supports the claim that the fertility drug
should be banned due to harm to these children. This is merely a taste of the
complexities involved in reasoning about the Non-Identity Problem in the multiple gestation context, one of the reasons I put it to one side in this Article
since it deserves its own separate analysis elsewhere.
86. 512 N.E.2d 691, 697, 698 (Ill. 1987) (citations omitted).
87. Id.; see also, e.g., Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 925 (Tex. 1984)
(“Thus, the cause of action unavoidably involves the relative benefits of an impaired life as opposed to no life at all. All courts, even the ones recognizing a
cause of action for wrongful life, have admitted that this calculation is impossible. . . . [T]his is not just a case in which the damages evade precise measurement. Here, it is impossible to rationally decide whether the plaintiff has
been damaged at all.”).
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The fact that courts, legislatures, and commentators have
accepted the implications of the Non-Identity Problem in one
area of the law but through BIRC discourse have entirely ignored it elsewhere may be further evidence of the “secret ambition” of best interests discourse—the choice of a palatable but
ultimately vacuous way of talking about regulating reproduction that forestalls confrontation with the controversial premises that lie beneath.
D. ATTEMPTS AT REFORMULATING BIRC ARGUMENTS ARE
UNAVAILING
As I have argued in-depth in Regulating Reproduction,
three tempting attempts to reformulate the BIRC argument so
as to avoid the problem raised by Parfit and recognized by the
88
wrongful life jurisprudence are unavailing.
Because BIRC reasoning is only problematic for cases that
produce children with lives not worth living, I first consider
whether we might still be able to use BIRC reasoning to justify
the state interventions discussed above by arguing that if left
unchecked these reproductive activities would indeed create a
89
life not worth living. Unfortunately, with the possible exception of the genetic abnormalities stemming from brother-sister
incest (and even there it is dubious), I show that none of the
lives created absent these interventions can plausibly result in
90
a life not worth living. These would have to be lives of negative utility, where existing is worse for the individual than not
91
existing. Even if not a null set, I have argued that this set is
vanishingly small, perhaps encompassing only truly awful diseases like Tay Sachs and Lesch Nyhan syndrome but not much
92
(if anything) else.
88. Cohen, supra note 5, at 471–513.
89. Id. at 472–74.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 473.
92. Infants with the incurable Lesch-Nyhan syndrome begin (at approximately 6 months of age) a process of neurological and physiological deterioration involving athetosis (involuntary writhing movements), severe mental deficiencies, and a tendency towards compulsive self-mutilation often requiring
placing the child’s elbows in splints, wrapping her hands in gauze, and sometimes extracting all her teeth. See, e.g., ROBERT F. WEIR, SELECTIVE
NONTREATMENT OF HANDICAPPED NEWBORNS 48–49 (1984). Tay-Sachs has its
onset in infancy and leads to “progressive retardation in development, paralysis, dementia (mental disorder), blindness, cherry-red retinal spots, and death
by age three or four years.” 5 ATTORNEYS’ TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE § 17.21(3)
(Roscoe N. Gray & Louise J. Gordy eds., 3d ed. 2000).
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The second reformulation draws a distinction between
what I have labeled perfect and imperfect Non-Identity Problems and suggests that BIRC reasoning is only problematic for
93
the perfect cases. In perfect cases—including the examples
discussed above of criminalizing brother-sister adult incest, abstinence education funding, and access restrictions to reproductive technology—BIRC-reasoning is self-contradictory because
the policy, if effective, will necessarily alter when, whether, and
with whom one reproduces, thereby creating a Non-Identity
Problem. By contrast, in imperfect cases—such as the interventions discussed above aimed at prohibiting sperm donor anonymity, making surrogacy agreements unenforceable, or prohibiting of payment for gamete donation or surrogacy
services—it is theoretically possible that the policy can be successful while not altering whether, when or with whom someone reproduces, but in reality is very unlikely to do so, since if
any of those alterations take place the Non-Identity Problem
will apply. While perfect Non-Identity Problems make BIRCtype justifications for policies nonsensical, imperfect NonIdentity Problems will sharply reduce the number of children
for whom the BIRC-type reasoning can be invoked in favor of a
given intervention. For example, for sperm donor anonymity,
the choice of whether to permit or prohibit donor anonymity is
very likely to alter which children come into existence, and
while there is chance that the exact same sperm donor provides
the exact same sperm to the exact the exact same recipient, and
that the fertilization occurs at the exact same time it would
have in an anonymity-permitted regime, the probability/number of resulting children for whom this is likely to be
true is extremely small. I show that at least as to these examples, concerns about this small probability of harming a small
94
number of children cannot justify these restrictions. It requires accepting burdening the liberty of large swaths of the
population to protect an extremely small number of potential
children in a way that is in tension with our rejection of a simi95
lar approach as to the best interests of existing children.
A third reformulation adapts proposals by philosophers
(most prominently Parfit himself and Dan Brock) who suggest
that the wrongfulness of these reproductive acts stems not from
harming the children that result but from the failure to pro93. Cohen, supra note 5, at 474 –76.
94. Id. at 477–81.
95. Id. at 476.
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duce children who suffered less or had more opportunity, an
outcome that is wrong from a non-person-affecting vantage
96
point, at least in certain cases. This is referred to as the “non
97
person-affecting principle” approach. Elsewhere, I have discussed several reasons why this approach will not succeed: it
cannot support the full gamut of programs for which BIRC is
usually invoked because it appears limited cases where the
same-number of children will exist whether or not the intervention is put in place, and we merely substitute the higher for
98
lower welfare person; it is problematically underinclusive as
99
to the categories of reproduction it seeks to regulate; it carries
100
disturbing implications as to enhancement and eugenics; and
on a political theoretical level it may not provide a valid basis
for criminalizing reproductive conduct or invading bodily
101
integrity.
***
BIRC and its reformulations fail. Where do we go from
here? We face two possible choices: the first is to accept that
these interventions are unjustified. The second is to drop the
fig leaf of BIRC, and delve into the secret ambition of best interests arguments pertaining to regulating reproduction, the
task of the remainder of this Article. I believe there are four
families of potential frameworks that might sustain the regulatory interventions described above—Reproductive Externalities, Wronging While Overall Benefitting, Legal Moralism, and
Virtue Ethics—but each of these holds problems I discuss below. In any event, as I hope to make clear, using any of these
approaches requires a move away from the comfortable (albeit
false) overlapping consensus between comprehensive moral
theories that BIRC arguments offer and requires instead adopting more contestable premises. Throughout, I consider how
these arguments might justify some modes of intervention (e.g.,
informational, funding) but not others (e.g., bodily integrity infringements, criminalization).

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. at 481–85.
Brock, supra note 69, at 273.
Cohen, supra note 5, at 485–93.
Id. at 494 –96.
Id. at 496–504.
Id. at 504 –12.
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II. REPRODUCTIVE EXTERNALITIES
A. REPRODUCTIVE EXTERNALITIES AND AN ANALOGY TO BEST
INTERESTS OF EXISTING CHILDREN REGULATION
The Non-Identity Problem is an obstacle for any attempt to
justify state intervention by claiming that the child who would
be produced absent the intervention is harmed. An approach I
call Reproductive Externalities suggests we merely need to
change our specification of the victim of the harm. Yes, the resulting child cannot be harmed if these interventions are not
put in place for the reasons set out by the Non-Identity Problem, but third parties may be harmed by this child’s existence.
Indeed, as I suggested above, one might find an analogue
to this approach in the Supreme Court cases countenancing interference with family privacy in the name of protecting the
best interests of existing children: while the child vulnerability
strand has become more prominent as the basis for intervention, there is also a strand suggesting it can be justified by
third party interests in selecting for citizenship that I call the
social planning strand.
To be sure, these cases are not a perfect match for our context; they directly regulate only one way in which parental behavior might jeopardize the interests of third parties: “[W]hen
parental behavior might make these children unable to participate politically.” While one or two of the reproductive acts the
State has targeted (discussed above) may produce that kind of
political participation deficit if left unchecked—increased risks
of genetic abnormalities from brother-sister incest is the intervention most likely to do so—most of the targeted reproductive
behavior seems unlikely to produce children incapable of the
mantle of citizenship.
There is also a disanalogy between the two contexts in the
way the parties are configured. In the family privacy cases the
parents’ interest lies in opposition not only to the State’s interest but also to the existing child’s interest (in becoming capable
of political participation) as well. By contrast, in reproductive
regulation cases parental liberty and state interests are potentially in opposition, but (because of the Non-Identity Problem)
we cannot say the child will be harmed if the State’s interests
do not trump. There are other differences—interference in rearing might be thought of as more or less noxious an interference
with liberty than interventions of the kind we have been discussing. But at the very least, the analogy suggests we should
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take seriously the possibility of justifying interventions based
on setbacks to the interests of third parties.
Reproductive externalities might take several forms: One
version is intrafamilial, wherein the intervention is urged not
to benefit the resulting child but to benefit other children of the
potential parent who already exist. For example, a claim that
parents over a certain age should not be allowed to reproduce
because the resulting child will likely suffer from impairments
due to the advanced maternal age and will remove resources
from its already-existing siblings. Such a claim allows the State
to recapture some of the political theoretical capital of BIRC—it
retains a Harm Principle justification focused on a particularly
vulnerable population, children, but just focuses on other
children.
However, the intra-familial variant faces several drawbacks as an adequate substitute for BIRC. First, it can only justify a much smaller set of regulation of reproduction—it requires that there be other children in the family already
existing for it to operate, which in many of the proposed regulations is unlikely to be the case. Second, it is quickly subject to a
reductio ad absurdum counterargument as to underinclusivity
in ways I will discuss below.
Accordingly, I instead focus on a more domain-general form
of Reproductive Externalities—the idea that the birth of certain
children will lead to cost-type externalities to third-parties
within a State, and that these externalities might serve as a
justification for the kinds of interventions discussed in Part I.
At first glance, this version appears to capture many of the
usages of BIRC-type reasoning that justify the regulations of
reproduction we have discussed. Even if we cannot say the resulting child is harmed because of the Non-Identity Problem,
the same deficits that are foisted on the child might count as
reasons why fellow taxpayers are harmed if they are forced to
pay for them. These costs are most tangible as to cases involving the imposition of disabilities (as the term is used colloquially) from genetic abnormalities stemming from brother-sister incest. The public fisc may have to pay for some costs here—for
example, the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(IDEA) requires the federal government to fund state and local
agencies to ensure “appropriate” education for the disabled “to
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102

meet their unique needs.” Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) forbids state and local governments from
denying to a “qualified individual with a disability” participation in or the benefits of “the services, programs, or activities of
a public entity,” for instance, by requiring a state courthouse to
103
have an elevator. Resulting disabilities may also place burdens on private employers, for example, under the accommoda104
tions requirements of Title III of the ADA.
Indeed, in some cases a form of the externalities argument
is already being offered alongside a BIRC type argument. For
example, for programs that receive abstinence education funding under either the Maternal and Child Health Services Block
Grants or the CBAE block grants, the programs must teach adolescents “that bearing children out-of-wedlock is likely to have
harmful consequences for the child, the child’s parents, and so105
ciety.” In such cases one tangible contribution of my work is
to show that the BIRC argument—if it must be recast in this
way to be coherent—will add nothing as a justification, since
the BIRC justification is already being improperly offered to
support those programs in addition to the Reproductive Externalities approach.
The bigger contribution, though, is to show that there are
several problems with embracing Reproductive Externalities as
a substitute for BIRC justifications: (1) the harms involved are
quite attenuated; (2) there is significant underinclusivity as to
what forms of reproduction are regulated; (3) the approach may
justify government-enforced enhancement; (4) the approach
does not adequately grapple with the possibility of positive ex102. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (2006); Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176,
179–84 (1982) (identifying the conditions of the Education of the Handicapped
Act); Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Mauney, 183 F.3d 816, 820–21 (8th Cir. 1999)
(describing rights under the IDEA).
103. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–12132 (2006); see also Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S.
509, 513–18 (2004) (discussing the ADA’s requirements in this regard and upholding the constitutionality of the ADA against an Eleventh Amendment
attack).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 12112( b)(5)(A); see also Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
527 U.S. 471, 477–79 (1999) (describing ADA applicability to private airlines);
cf. Eric Rakowski, Who Should Pay for Bad Genes, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1345,
1382 (2002) (“Defenders of the person-affecting restriction note that many
people, including potential parents, siblings, insurers, insurance purchasers,
and public officials and the taxpayers they represent, will be worse off if a
child is born disabled when a different child might have been born without the
disability. Ordinarily, their interests alone will justify spending on preconception or intrauterine screening programs.”).
105. 42 U.S.C. § 710( b)(2); JONES & MOVAHED, supra note 21, at 4.
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ternalities; (5) the approach faces complications as to valuing
new lives that may limit its applicability to same number substitutions; (6) on the logic of this approach it may be better to
force parents to internalize reproductive externalities rather
than to prevent or discourage reproduction, and (7) the approach may depend on eugenic premises we find objectionable.
I set out these problems one-by-one in the rest of this Part.
Nevertheless, as I explain below, once we have seen the available alternatives I will argue that this justification for regulating reproduction—the one given the least attention in the
scholarly literature—is the best of a not very good lot. While
the Reproductive Externality approach seems like the best way
forward to justify regulating reproduction, given its problems
and limitations it can justify only a much more narrow swath of
regulation than that which currently exists.
B. PROBLEMS WITH THE REPRODUCTIVE EXTERNALITIES
APPROACH
1. Attenuation of Externalities and the Harm Principle
While, as discussed, genetic abnormalities that may result
from brother-sister adult incestual reproductive sex and possibly advanced maternal age can give rise to externalized costs of
106
a predictable and measurable sort, the other interventions
discussed in Part I produce much more attenuated and speculative externalities. In some cases, for example, sperm donor anonymity and the prohibition on commercialized surrogacy or
the enforcement of surrogacy agreements, the link between the
deficits experienced by children and the cost externalities
seems strained. Consider regulation to prevent access to reproductive technologies for single or LGBT parents. Most of the
(extremely contested) studies suggesting some impairment
106. According to one facility, the risk of Down syndrome increases from 1
in 952 to 1 in 30 as maternal age increases from 30 to 45 years of age if the
patient is using her own eggs, but reduces to the 30 year old risk level if the
egg provider is 30 years old. Advanced Maternal Age, CAL. IVF,
http://www.californiaivf.com/AMA.htm ( last visited Apr. 18, 2012). Thus, older
women who reproduce with younger women’s eggs do not pose increased risk.
Id. If advanced maternal age is also paired with advanced paternal age or
there is no supporting father, there is also the possibility of externalized costs
in the case of death before the child reaches the age of majority, in which case
the child may become a ward of the state, but that is likely in only a very
small fraction of cases. Moreover, there will be significant underinclusivity
problems in that many parents with shorter than average life expectancies reproduce in ways the law does not seek to prevent.
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from being raised in a single parent family focus on things like
cognitive development, likelihood to complete high school, alco107
hol and drug use, and gender role assumption. Even if these
things had a likely negative impact on the child’s welfare (the
problematic BIRC argument), their impact on social welfare,
especially from the point of view of cost externalities, is less
clear; the impact of the potential harm to the child seems to
lose force as it diffuses through all of the facets of social life,
until it feels more like a whimper when we get to the question
of cost externalities.
All things being equal, is it bad if, for example, children
have worse rather than better cognitive development, and does
that really impose costs on society? In one very attenuated
sense it does—perhaps there is a higher probability that children who end up with lower IQs will eventually contribute less
to the tax base, require more resources in public schools, or be
more prone to incarceration. But, if the Harm Principle is to
have any bite as a serious liberal limit on interventions that restrict liberty, such small and speculative externalities seem
108
problematic when used as justifications. As Feinberg has noted in the criminal context, whether a Harm Principle argument
is persuasive as a basis for limiting liberty depends in part on
the gravity of the harm that will result, its probability, the value of the conduct that is being prohibited, and the importance
of the underlying interest which will be thwarted by the inter109
vention. Here it would seem many of these considerations cut
107. See, e.g., Marsha Garrison, Is Consent Necessary? An Evaluation of the
Emerging Law of Cohabitant Obligation, 52 UCLA L. REV. 815, 861–65 (2005)
(collecting studies); Holly J. Harlow, Paternalism Without Paternity: Discrimination Against Single Women Seeking Artificial Insemination by Donor, 6 S.
CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 173, 198–203 (1996) (collecting studies).
108. Cf. Epstein, supra note 47, at 2325 (observing, in regard to “soft externalities” (such as corruption of society’s view of women’s sexuality) from
contractualized commercial surrogacy that “John Stuart Mill’s classic statement that the sole justification for restricting individual liberty is the prevention of harm to others is wholly gutted if the conception of harm is given a
meaning as broad as that supposed in this context”).
109. FEINBERG, supra note 14, at 187–217; see also Robertson, supra note
69, at 18 (“[M]any of the conditions of concern involve questions of relative
well-being, and may not themselves impose such significant costs on others as
to justify limitation of a person’s reproductive plans in order to avoid them.”).
But see Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 109, 183 (1999) (“Once non-trivial harm arguments have
been made, we inevitably must look beyond the harm principle. We must look
beyond the traditional structure of the debate over the legal enforcement of
morality. We must access larger debates in ethics, law and politics—debates
about power, autonomy, identity, human flourishing, equality, freedom and
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against the regulation. Even if one does not accept the extreme
position that procreative liberty is of central (indeed trumping
110
constitutional) concern, it is beyond cavil that these interventions restrict interests that many view as important with significant welfare implications. Again, restrictions on whether
one can reproduce seem to impinge the most on what in other
work I have referred to as a potential “right to be a genetic par111
ent,” and thus we should be particularly skeptical of using attenuated and speculative externalities as the basis for justifying such regulation. Even forced delays in the timing of
reproduction or the denial of particular partner choices limit
liberty in significant ways.
On some philosophical frameworks, there is a further question of whether one should aggregate small negative externali112
ties or whether there are instead “irrelevant utilities.” On
other interests and values that give meaning to the claim that an identifiable
harm matters.”).
110. See, e.g., JOHN ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE 16–18 (1994)
(adopting a strong view along these lines).
111. See Cohen, supra note 15, at 1121–25.
112. Utilitarians typically aggregate small harms to many people and
count the sum. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 23–24 (1971)
(discussing the societal balance of present and future gains against present
and future losses). The deontologist Frances Kamm has instead suggested that
not all harms and benefits are equal, under what she calls the “Principle of
Irrelevant Utility”: Suppose two almost identical individuals A and B are mortally ill and we have only enough serum to save one, but because of tiny differences in how much serum they need if we save A there will be enough serum
left over to also cure person C’s sore throat, but if we save B there will not be.
Kamm argues that it would be unjust in this circumstance to allocate the serum to A rather than B on this basis as opposed to holding a straight lottery
between the two. If the sore throat is not enough to justify giving A preference
over B when everything is equal, says Kamm, it is an “irrelevant utility” such
that even if we could save not only C’s sore throat but a million such sore
throats, for example, it would not matter; the utility bonus is irrelevant and
therefore even aggregated in large quantities cannot count. Quite different,
she claims, would be a case where in fact the serum enables us to save C’s leg,
which would be a relevant utility. See F.M. KAMM, MORALITY, MORTALITY:
DEATH AND WHOM TO SAVE FROM IT 144 –63 (1993); Frances M. Kamm, To
Whom?, 24 HASTING CTR. REP. 29, 31–32 (1994). On this view, one might also
suggest there are irrelevant disutilities, and in our context even if the aggregate of small attenuated cost externalities “add up” to more than the concentrated negative externalities on those whose liberty is restricted by the intervention, those small cost externalities may be as irrelevant as sore throats.
Kamm’s claim is controversial. For one critique see John Broome, All Goods
are Relevant, in SUMMARY MEASURES OF POPULATION HEALTH: CONCEPTS,
ETHICS, MEASUREMENT AND APPLICATIONS 727, 727–28 (Christopher J.L.
Murray et al. eds., 2002) (suggesting the argument only proves that curing a
sore throat does not matter more than fairness in this context, not that curing
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views that adopt a model of irrelevant utilities, the Reproductive Externalities approach faces additional difficulties.
All that said, it may be that the attenuation of harms problem is fatal to Reproductive Externalities justifications of only
some means of intervention but not others. That is, we might
demand that the threshold point at which cost-externalities can
count varies with the means by which the State seeks to influence the target decision and the concomitant invasion of liberty, if any. While cost-externalities may seem problematic to justify an intervention that invades bodily integrity or imposes
criminal sanction, it seems unremarkable for the government
to use informational interventions like public service campaigns for abstinence as a tool for minimizing even small and
uncertain cost-externalities, and the other means seem somewhere in between. Thus, of all the regulations of reproduction
discussed in Part I, abstinence education seems the most justifiable on this ground because it demands that the individual
only delay coital intercourse until adulthood or marriage, and
because (to return to the Taxonomy developed in Part I) the
means of influencing the target reproductive decision is the
113
least intrusive, the provision of information.
In sum, the Reproductive Externalities argument seems
only persuasive in a much smaller subset of cases involving
high-probability harms that are likely to seriously impinge on
the public fisc and where the means of influencing the target
decision are less intrusive, which rules out most of the reproductive regulations discussed above.
2. Underinclusivity
Deploying the Reproductive Externalities argument to defend the interventions of Part I shows them to be problemati114
cally underinclusive. There are many forms of reproduction
producing comparable or worse Reproductive Externalities and
nonreproductive externalities, where no such intervention has
been imposed. If many of us would reject intervention in those
cases, and those cases cannot meaningfully be distinguished,
a sore throat is irrelevant or would never count for anything, and offering as
counter example the U.K. Health Services’ decision to give out millions of analgesics for headaches that at some level, due to health care rationing and
fixed budgets, means that someone’s life will not be saved).
113. See discussion supra Part I.A–B.
114. This is similar to a problem I have raised for the non-person-affecting
principle approach as discussed in Cohen, supra note 5, at 481–512.
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that casts doubt about how good this reformulation is as a
BIRC substitute.
To wit, the genetic abnormalities resulting from brothersister incest are less likely to result and also less serious in
terms of their effects on the population of resulting children
than those that result from the mating of carriers of Tay-Sachs
or a number of other genetic disorders. And yet our government
has not required mandatory screening for these disorders—an
intervention which is less liberty-intrusive as to particular individuals than the criminalization of brother-sister incest since
it would merely force individuals to have the information, not
control their sexual relationships—and it certainly has not
made it illegal for Tay-Sachs carriers to reproduce. If you think
brother-sister incest may be unique on legal moralistic grounds,
the same point could be made as to many of the other interventions I have discussed. Another example comes from the alleged
effects on child welfare of single parenthood: the harms it is
claimed will occur from single parenthood will be the same
whether it arises coitally or through reproductive technology,
such that someone who defends a restriction on reproductive
technology use by single individuals ought to also apply the
same limit to coital reproduction intended to give rise to single
parenthood.
This underinclusivity might not be normatively problematic if there were meaningful distinctions between what is regulated and left unregulated, perhaps drawing on the difficulty
and intrusiveness of attempts to regulate natural reproductive
(as opposed to assisted reproductive) behavior. That response,
however, fails to perfectly capture the current line of regulation
in that we have directly regulated adult sexual activity by criminalizing brother-sister incest while leaving alone procreative
activities that portend much more certain and significant Reproductive Externalities, so we ought to be cautious before fully
115
buying into this possible distinction.
One might try to more defensibly distinguish subcategories of assisted reproductive technology use, for example
by hiving-off assisted reproduction involving the gametes of
partners in an intimate relationship from that using the gam115. That said, one might avoid this problem by decriminalizing brothersister adult incest but retaining the other interventions discussed or by arguing that brother-sister incest is special and criminalization is justified by a
quite different and independent reason, such as the Legal Moralism I sketch
below.
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etes of strangers to that relationship. Whether that move is
persuasive depends on one’s valuation of different forms of procreative and parental autonomy. This is a big question, and one
that deserves its own article, so I will just confine myself to a
couple of brief remarks. The philosopher Daniel Statman has
described the interest in reproduction as
the desire to achieve a kind of immortality by continuing to live
through descendants, the desire to live vicariously through one’s children, getting a second chance, as it were, the desire for the deep and
enduring intimate relations that one hopes to achieve with one’s offspring, the longing for a home, a nest, a secure place with a close
network of relationships in which one belongs, and, in addition, the
116
interest of couples to found a family.

On one reading of that list, only reproduction by those
without any genetic tie to the offspring (none of the cases in
Part I) is distinguished. On a different reading, regulating reproduction that involves even one non-intimate partner (single,
LGBT parents, commercialized surrogacy) is more justified because of the lower status of the interests represented by that
kind of procreation. Would we be right in thinking that for the
interest to be worth protecting, there must be a perfect overlap
between the genetic partners, romantic partners, and rearing
partners? Certainly some religious conceptions of procreation
that condemn it outside of marriage view reproduction as worthy because it unifies an already existing romantic relationship, but that is a conception against which many of us would
chaff. Even if this kind of move succeeds (and I am not at all
sure it does) it still would not defend drawing the line between
coital and assisted reproduction as such; instead it would counsel making a division between reproduction by single parents,
however it is achieved, and reproduction by intimate partners.
Thus, the underinclusivity seems to persist and demands that
we either reject some of the interventions in Part I or add prohibitions on their coital equivalents. If we are unwilling to do
so, that is some reason to doubt the Reproductive Externalities
approach as a sufficient justification.
The underinclusivity problem seems even more pronounced
on the intrafamilial externalities variant. Consider the decision
as to how many children to have, one that is currently left
largely unregulated in the West. It seems likely to me that the
externalized cost to one existing child of having five additional
siblings added to the family through coital reproduction is far

116. Statman, supra note 15, at 226.
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greater than the externalized cost to that child of having one
additional child added if the additional child was conceived via
an anonymous sperm donor; this seems true even if we used
the social science data painting the most detrimental effects to
children of being the product of anonymous donor conception.
Thus, if we actually cared about preventing intrafamilial externalities, we should favor regulating the number of children
one can have as well as (or instead of) donor anonymity. Of
course, the echoes of China’s one child policy are quite chilling
in this regard.
3. The Problem of Enhancement
A third objection is that the Reproductive Externalities approach proves too much in that it ought to justify not only the
moral wrongfulness of reproductive decisions to avoid what I
have elsewhere called diminishment—producing a child who is
on balance significantly worse-off as compared to the normal
child, a child who will “experience serious suffering or limited
117
opportunity or serious loss of happiness or good” —but also a
duty to engage in enhancement—to produce a child who is, on
balance, significantly better-off as compared to the “normal”
child (scare quotes used to emphasize the loaded nature of this
118
term).
There is no reason why the amount of externalities imposed by the average child should be given moral significance
as a baseline. If the argument justifies regulating reproduction
to reduce externalities in excess of those imposed by the normal
child, it is not clear why it ought also not justify using the same
means to prompt enhancement to further reduce externalities
below the level of those imposed by the normal child, assuming
119
the externalities are of the same size, attenuation, etc. This is
particularly troubling because, if the amount of externalityreduction one gets from certain enhancements are far greater
than those from merely preventing diminishment, it would
117. Cohen, supra note 52, at 363 n.46 (citation omitted).
118. Again, I have made similar points as to the non-person-affecting principle approach in Cohen, supra note 5, at 481–512.
119. It may be that as to particular enhancements and diminishments that
assumption is not warranted, that the negative externalities avoided by legally requiring enhancement are smaller or more attenuated than those by legally requiring diminishment, but the opposite could also be true. In a sense, the
first objection I consider to the Reproductive Externalities approach has been
sensitive to this possibility, and here I am holding that objection constant and
imagining the same externalities either way.
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seem as though the State was more justified in employing
means designed to prompt enhancement than some of the
means employed in the examples in Part I. This too can be
thought of as an underinclusivity problem, with the State’s actions being problematic in taking steps to prevent parents diminishing their children but not pushing parents to enhance,
when on the Reproductive Externalities approach the two are
equivalent. Otherwise put, this is a baseline problem familiar
to legal academics that asks why the level of externalities imposed by the normal child today is normatively significant.
Notice, though, what adopting a duty to enhance would
mean: It is not enough to avoid an incestuous reproductive
partner; one would have failed in one’s duty if one did not
choose as good a reproductive partner for one’s child as possible. Similarly, it is not enough to abstain from reproductive sex
during one’s adolescent years. Instead a woman might fail in
her duty to her child unless she waits until her career, wealth,
etc., are in the ideal position for child-rearing. And, if genetic
enhancements improving the lives of the children who result
are possible, one who fails to use them would have failed in this
duty. If endorsing the reproductive externalities approach required this conclusion, for many that would be a reason to not
endorse it.
Still more troubling is what this means for legal regulation
of reproduction. If, in spite of my objections in this Part, one
takes the Reproductive Externalities approach to justify legal
regulation of reproduction for cases involving diminishment,
and the Reproductive Externalities approach does not distinguish diminishment and enhancement, then legal regulation
(including potential criminal sanction) of reproduction to force
enhancement is equally justified. Can this approach avoid that
implication?
One response would be to try and distinguish reproductive
activities that fail to enhance from those that diminish on an
act-omission basis: failure to enhance is like failing to perform
an easy rescue of a drowning person, which (in American law)
is typically not made tortious or criminal. This approach will
not work. Bracketing whether the act-omission distinction
should have purchase even in the drowning person case, it
seems particularly weak as to Reproductive Externalities. One
can, for example, make the classic Legal Realist move of questioning the baseline: Why should the baseline level of acceptable externalities be that of the average child such that the fail-
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ure to enhance beyond that is an omission, instead of treating a
child that produced fewer externalities as the baseline and
treat parents who fail to enhance as having acted? Indeed, it is
not clear there are any true omissions here at all. In both the
enhancement and diminishment context the individual has engaged in a reproductive act that has brought someone into existence and produced externalities.
A different response is that one need not be committed to a
maximization thesis (or more accurately a minimization thesis
as to net negative externalities); instead one could be more of a
Sufficientarian about externalities. In normative ethics,
Sufficientarians are a group of Welfarist theorists not committed to maximizing welfare but instead with ensuring that individuals do not fall below a critical threshold of whatever is the
120
My imagined externalities
currency of distribution.
Sufficientarian (I am not sure anyone has actually taken this
position) is similarly not concerned with minimizing net negative externalities but instead in ensuring that net negative externalities do not go above a certain set threshold; the claim
would be that while regulating reproduction to avoid diminishment is needed to prevent externalities above the threshold,
requiring enhancement is unnecessary because without it the
normal child is already at threshold. Even to construct the sentence reveals that this would be a tremendous just-so story: in
order to maintain such a claim, one would need a Goldilocks
theory explaining why the externalities imposed by the average
child are just right, and I am aware of no theory that adequately defends such a claim.
A different response is that enhancements are distinguishable in practice because there are safety or theological concerns
121
with genetic manipulation, because some enhancements are
not good for the child (to the extent they allow parents to
hegemonically foreclose certain avenues for the child instead of
122
securing a “right to an open future”), because we lack suffi123
cient foresight to pick good traits, or because the availability
of enhancements problematically exacerbates inequalities be-

120. See Roger Crisp, Equality, Priority, and Compassion, 113 ETHICS 745,
757–63 (2003); Harry Frankfurt, Equality as a Moral Ideal, 98 ETHICS 21, 21–
25 (1987).
121. See, e.g., Leon R. Kass, The Wisdom of Repugnance, in THE ETHICS OF
HUMAN CLONING 3, 18–24 (1998).
122. BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 69, at 156–203.
123. Id. at 179–82.
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tween those who have access to enhancing technologies and
124
those who do not. Even assuming arguendo that these points
were true as to all genetic enhancements, the arguments seem
less apposite as to the duties towards non-genetic forms of enhancement that parallel our cases (delaying reproduction,
choosing particular reproductive partners, etc.).
However,
the
assumption
that
the
enhancement/diminishment line maps neatly on to the moreburdensome/less-burdensome one is problematic. There are
some forms of enhancement that would require a fairly small
restriction on liberty (for example, taking a particular dietary
supplement once a week while pregnant that is shown to improve the intelligence of resulting children beyond the normal
range) while there are some actions one would need to take to
avoid diminishment that will involve significant limitations on
one’s life choices (for example, being unable to reproduce as a
single or LGBT individual, or being subject to criminal sanction
unless one chooses a reproductive partner other than one’s ge125
netic sibling with whom one is in love). If what matters to us
is the level of restriction in relation to the size of the externality, it would be better to draw the line on that criterion directly,
rather than using the enhancement-distinction as a muddled
heuristic—indeed I suggest doing so below. That would, however, still allow the State to legally require some enhancements.
It is still open to us to take the other horn of the dilemma
and accept a symmetrical duty to enhance such that the state
can justifiably use the same legal interventions as in Part I not
only to induce substitutions of “normal” for diminished children
but also to induce the substitution of enhanced children for
“normal” ones. For some, this implication of the Reproductive
Externalities approach may be unsettling enough to justify rejecting it. For others (of which I would include myself), the intuitive discomfort of supporting legally enforceable duties to
enhance can be mitigated by introducing limiting principles
such as requiring extremely large negative externalities and
the least intrusive of the means of influencing the target repro126
ductive decision. However, (assuming we have rejected the
externalities sufficientarian approach) whatever cabining we
must do on the enhancement side to make the non-person124. See id. at 187–91.
125. Cf. FEINBERG, supra note 14, at 163–65 (making a similar point for
criminal law).
126. See supra Table 1.
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affecting principle approach plausible ought to apply equally on
the diminishment side. I believe many of the interventions justified by BIRC will not be supportable on the Reproductive Externalities approach, when so cabined, as I discuss in more
depth below.
4. The Problem of Positive Externalities
Suppose we are able to overcome the prior three problems
and can restrict ourselves to preventing diminishment, in a
way that avoids problematic underinclusivity or attenuation of
externalities. Even if we accomplished all that, there is a further problem with Reproductive Externalities as a justification
for legal intervention.
As against cost-externalities, which are negative, we have
to also consider the positive externalities of the existence of
these children. Just as courts in the wrongful life context are
unwilling to conclude that from a child’s own perspective the
impairments it faces outweigh the positive benefits of its exist127
ence, from a social welfare point of view we ought to be cautious in concluding that our (third-party) lives would be better
if these children did not come into existence than if they did.
Even if we assume arguendo that children raised by single parents, conceived through anonymous sperm donation, etc., impose externalized costs sufficient to justify intervention based
128
on a Millian Harm Principle, these children may also make
significant social contributions to education, art, or wealth, because of these same conditions. Moreover, even if we became
convinced (arguendo) that they made fewer contributions to social welfare than did the “better” children, that does not mean
that their contribution is a net drain on the well-being of others.
Here I am somewhat eliding a further complicated question for the argument by mixing in what are strictly cost and
noncost externalities. Suppose that the birth of these children
produces a predictable increase in social spending on education
programs and therefore increases tax burdens. On the positive
externalities side, can that be outweighed by a very nonmonetary benefit, for example the creation of more music by
129
artists like Alicia Keys, who was raised by a single mother?
127. See supra text accompanying notes 87–92.
128. See JOHN STEWART MILL, ON LIBERTY (Albury Castell ed., F.S. Crofts
& Co. 1947) (1859).
129. Alicia Keys Biography, BIOGRAPHY CHANNEL, http://www.thebiography
channel.co.uk/biographies/alicia-keys.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2012).
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Or are benefits from the existence of music and increased tax
burdens the kinds of things that belong in separate spheres of
130
valuation such that they cannot be traded off?
One possible response to all of these concerns would be to
borrow from a suggestion Dan Brock and Derek Parfit have
made in the non-person-affecting-principle approach that I
131
have discussed elsewhere, and limit the scope of the argument to same-number substitutions: we can restrict the argument to the claim that interventions are justified where an individual whose reproductive decisions are targeted will
substitute a child that imposes fewer cost externalities on others than a child who would impose more—that is apply the argument only where the same number of children will exist and
our regulation merely steers one into coming into existence instead of the other.
That solution comes at the cost of substantially narrowing
the set of interventions for which externality-based arguments
can be used. Interventions aimed at influencing whether individuals reproduce are completely untenable on this justification
since the result is never a same-number substitution, and regulation of when or with whom an individual reproduces may
have de facto effects on the number of children born that will
push them out of the same-number category. For example, as I
have noted elsewhere, if we required that all sperm donors be
non-anonymous we are likely to both reduce the supply of donors and cause some parents to be unwilling to reproduce
through sperm donation, thus changing the number of children
132
who come into existence.
Even when limited to same-number cases, the Reproductive Externalities approach is still susceptible to a more subtle
objection: even if most children born without the regulation
would impose more net negative externalities than those we
would substitute in their place, it is possible that allowing their
130. Cf. MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF
PLURALSIM AND EQUALITY 3–10 (1983); Dan W. Brock, Separate Spheres and
Indirect Benefits, 1 COST EFFECTIVENESS & RESOURCE ALLOCATION 4 (2003),
http://www.resource-allocation.com/content/1/1/4; Cohen, supra note 43, at
696–703.
131. Cohen, supra note 8, at 481–512; I. Glenn Cohen, Response: Rethinking Sperm-Donor Anonymity: Of Changed Selves, Nonidentity, and One-Night
Stands, 100 GEO. L.J. 431, 441–42 (2012) [hereinafter Cohen, Rethinking
Sperm-Donor Anonymity].
132. See Cohen, Rethinking Sperm-Donor Anonymity, supra note 131, at
435–37.
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birth occasionally produces someone who creates such huge
positive externalities to the world (a Mozart, a Van Gogh) that
he outbalances the net negative externalities of the others. In a
quite different context, Savulescu offers one response to this objection: even if you were worried that use of Preimplantation
Genetic Diagnosis to select embryos without a predisposition to
asthma for implantation might result in eliminating a Mozart,
133
not choosing such embryos might result in that as well. It is
not clear the same point holds here in that one might think being a great artist is not independent to one’s health and conditions of upbringing the way it appears to be independent of being an asthmatic. One might also make a hedge-your-bets-type
argument that in the face of uncertainty it would be desirable
that children of both types come into existence, or a synergy argument that great artists (to use my recurring example)
emerge out of the interactions between children reared in different environments, although it is possible that the forms of
reproduction we do not regulate create enough diversity in this
regard. In any event, even if this objection is overcome, the limitation to same-number cases is likely fatal to most of the regulations of reproduction described above.
5. Complications of Trading-Off Externalities Against the
Value of Newly Created Children
Between a claim that net externalities are negative in a
given case and the desire to prevent these births, there lie two
other intellectual complexities that also push towards limiting
the Reproductive Externalities argument to same-number cases.
Externalities-Only? The first complexity stems from distinguishing a position that truly cared only about externalities
from these acts of reproduction versus a position that cared
about externalities but also added to the calculus the value of
these additional children’s lives should they come into existence. I will illustrate using a crude utilitarian framework and
some fictional numbers, but I emphasize that a parallel point
can be made on any other Welfarist frame, which is to say this
complexity is inevitable for any theory that cares about the welfare of individuals as a component of what makes the world
134
good.
133. Julian Savulescu, Procreative Beneficence: Why We Should Select the
Best Children, 15 BIOETHICS 413, 418 (2001).
134. Deontologists face a similar problem as well, since they often begin with
a commitment to pursuing the Good, but merely add constraints and options.
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Suppose a child born to a woman over age forty-five generates positive externalities for its genetic parents of 2, negative
externalities for the world at large (other than the parents) of
3, but the child’s existence and its own happiness adds to the
world utility (or some other measure of welfare or well-being) of
135
2. On a view that cared only about externalities the net externalities are -1, in which case one can conclude that the reproductive act poses net negative externalities and perhaps
that action is justified. By contrast, on the view that the child’s
existence counts positively in the calculus, the calculus favors
the reproductive act (2 + 2 >-3). John Broome has described the
externalities-only view as one that treats “the lifetime wellbeing of a person who is added to the world [as] is in itself ethically neutral,” that is, “the goodness of the person’s own life does
136
not count ethically.”
The externalities-only view is simpler because it does not
require us to balance the value of the child’s coming into existence as against the negative externalities to others. However, it
is probably wrong. Why would we ignore the value one’s life has
to favor only looking at externalities? Imagine that every individual in our population will have utility 4 and produce net
negative externalities of -1. Imagine we have a choice of having
3 individuals in our population or 10. On the view that we ignored the utility of new individuals’ lives, we ought to favor the
smaller population because there will be more net negative externalities with the larger population, but it seems wrong to ignore the fact that we now have 7 additional lives, lives so good
that they more than compensate for the net negative externalities in a global comparison. Indeed, in this hypothetical if we
could add 5 billion people with utility 5000 (but each with net
negative externalities -1), the externalities-only argument
would say it would be wrong to do so, which seems perplexing.
To be more tangible, it is possible we already live in a world
where children produce net negative externalities—our planet
135. That this number is positive is significant because it means the child
has a life worth living.
136. John Broome, Should We Value Population?, 13 J. POL. PHIL. 399, 400
(2005). At this juncture it is worth reiterating that here (as throughout the
project) I am not claiming that children are harmed if they are not brought
into existence. Instead I share with others the view that “no one is harmed in
not being created, because there is no one to be harmed if we do not create
someone.” Kamm, supra note 75. However, there is a difference between saying X is harmed by not being brought into existence, and that in evaluating
whether a world where X is brought into existence is preferable we ought to
consider (at least in part) the goodness of X’s life.
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is already heavily populated. If all we cared about were net
negative externalities, it may be that something like China’s
one child policy should be favored, even if we knew every additional child produced would have a quite happy life and the
sum of that happy life and its externalized benefits would far
outweigh the net negative externalities. I have tried to make
this argument here in a less formal and more intuitive way, but
others have supplied more formal versions that are also quite
137
persuasive.
Average or Total? Assume we reject the externalitiesonly view and instead adopt a view that counted the child’s existence and the happiness it might bring into the global calculus. We now face the second complexity: do we treat the child’s
welfare as counting in a total or an average way, akin to a
problem I have discussed with non-person-affecting princi138
ples. As part of a consequentialist theory—I will again use
utilitarianism instead of other variants of consequentialism for
139
explanatory simplicity —one could have two quite different
views about how to aggregate utility between persons. Total
utilitarians would sum up the utility of every individual in the
set such that a population of 100,000 people with utility of (illustratively) 5 each would be more desirable than (indeed twice
as desirable as) a population of 50,000 people with utility 5
each; by contrast, average utilitarians would divide all utility
by the number of individuals in the population such that both
140
of those hypothetical populations are equally desirable. On
the total view, each new child’s welfare counts against the net
negative externalities. By contrast, on the average view, it is
the effect of the new child’s welfare on the average utility that
is traded-off against its effect on negative externalities.
Let us return for a moment to my earlier example—the
choice between a population of three or ten, each with utility
four and net negative externalities of negative one. On the total
view, the addition of the seven other individuals would be favored since it adds four more per child, or twenty-one in total
137. E.g., LOUIS KAPLOW, THE THEORY OF TAXATION AND PUBLIC ECONOM387–90 (2008); Broome, supra note 136. Broome suggests that while the
welfare of these not-yet-existing children should count in evaluating the goodness of a state of the world, it may not create a responsibility to produce these
children, thus avoiding the problematic suggestion that there is a duty to reproduce in a way that maximizes total utility. Broome, supra note 136, at 412–13.
138. See Cohen, supra note 5, at 481–512.
139. Once again, the equivalent problem is faced by deontologists as well.
140. See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 52, at 260–62.
ICS
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(which, of course, ultimately have to be traded-off as against
the net negative externalities of negative four). On the average
view, we ought to be indifferent as to whether these seven people are added to the population—the average utility of the children born will be four either way. One could also construct cases where the total utilitarian favored one population and the
141
average affirmatively favored another.
Which view should we favor, total or average? Kaplow has
offered two thought experiments to show why the total view
142
seems superior. Imagine that we are choosing between population A of 10 individuals with utility 100 or population B of
nine individuals with utilities of 110 each. The total view prefers A, the average view prefers B. Kaplow’s first argument asks
us to imagine ourselves behind a veil of ignorance uncertain
whether we are one of the individuals who exist in both A or B,
or just in A. He then suggests that rational maximization would
lead us to prefer being one of the 10 individuals who do certainly
exist in population A versus having a 90% chance of being one of
the actual individuals and a 10% chance of not existing.
Perhaps motivated by uncertainties as to the value of veil
of ignorance type arguments when nonexistence is involved,
Kaplow also offers a second argument. Suppose we begin with
population C of 10 individuals with utility 100 (such that total
utility is 1000 and average utility is 100). Now suppose that we
could implement a regime that would raise each existing individual’s utility to 105 and add an additional individual with
utility 28 that is above the threshold of a life worth living. Call
this population D (total utility is 1078, average is 98). Under a
variation of the Pareto principle, Kaplow suggests D is better
than C, because all individuals who are alive under either regime prefer D to C, even though C has lower average utility—
everyone is made better off, no one is made worse off. This
alone suggests total is a better measure than average, because
there are Pareto-superior distributions where average utility
has decreased while total utility has increased. Finally, imagine we can “implement a further reform that equalizes utility
for all individuals at an average level that is one unit higher
than that in [population D],” call this population E (total utility
141. See Cohen & Chen, supra note 12, at 521 n.141 (demonstrating the
possibility of divergences between total and average utilitarianism with several examples).
142. The following description is drawn (with some slight simplifications
and clarifications) from KAPLOW, supra note 137, at 387–89.
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is 1089, average is 99), which “raises total utility and also distributes it more equally, which raises social welfare under any
standard [social welfare function] (utilitarian or strictly con143
cave).” In moving through two steps from C to E “we have
moved from a population of 10 with a utility of 100 each to a
population of 11 with utility a 99 each,” and “[i]f each step involves an increase in social welfare, then so must the
144
combination.”
If the total view is adopted it will be harder for the Reproductive Externalities argument to justify the reproductive regulations discussed in Part I, because they have a tendency to reduce the number of children brought into existence, each of
whom adds to welfare.
What holds us back from adopting the total view wholesale? It threatens to lead to what Parfit has termed the Repugnant Conclusion—“[f]or any possible population of at least ten
billion people, all with a very high quality of life, there must be
some much larger imaginable population whose existence, if
other things are equal, would be better, even though its mem145
bers have lives that are barely worth living.” It “would imply
that we should increase total happiness slightly by vastly increasing the population, even though we thereby make every
existing person much worse off,” and it is “[o]nly personaffecting principles [that] seem likely to avoid unacceptable
implications like the Repugnant Conclusion, since only they require that a reduction in suffering or an increase in happiness
146
be to a distinct individual.” This is illustrated in the top half
of Diagram 1: we could vastly expand our population from the
bar on the left (seven billion people with utility five each = thirty-five billion total utility) to the bar on the right (eighty billion
people with utility .5 each = forty billion total utility). This
would result in a much larger number of people with lives just
barely worth living, thus increasing total utility but producing
people with much worse lives than we currently have.

143.
144.
145.
146.

Id. at 388.
Id.
PARFIT, supra note 69, at 388; see also KAPLOW, supra note 137.
BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 69, at 254.
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Diagram 1

However, average utilitarianism also appears to lead us to
a different kind of repugnant conclusion, which Parfit calls the
“Mere Addition Paradox” (represented in the lower half of Diagram 1), that the world would be better if Adam and Eve, both
with very high utility existed alone rather than if in addition to
Adam and Eve there also existed fifty billion other people with
very good lives but utilities just below Adam and Eve (say
9.99999 repeating). That is, the latter world is a worse one on
the average view, since the addition of these people has diminished the average from what it was with just Adam and Eve existing. This conclusion seems wrong. Indeed, perhaps still more
strangely, the average utilitarian should be indifferent as to
Adam and Eve, each with utility ten, existing versus Adam and
Eve plus fifty billion other people, all with utility ten, existing,
for in each case the average utility is exactly the same.
Both Brock and Parfit candidly admit that the only way to
avoid both of these paradoxes is to provide a comprehensive
theory that mixes person-affecting and non-person-affecting
principles—they call it “Theory X”—but note that no such com-
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147

prehensive theory has yet been formulated. Therefore, as I
have discussed elsewhere, Brock and his co-authors limit the
scope of the application of non-person-affecting principles to
148
same-number cases. Only in these cases—where the number
of individuals brought into existence stays the same and we
merely substitute higher for lower welfare children—can we be
sure that the move is desirable. This same solution is available
here. As discussed above, we could limit the Reproductive Externalities approach to same-number substitution cases, but
only at the cost of limiting the scope of cases to which the Reproductive Externalities approach will justify regulating
149
reproduction.
6. Internalizing the Externality
In many instances, when legal arguments identify negative
externalities as a problem the preferred solution is to redesign
the system such that individuals internalize the externality. In
principle, a form of that argument is available here. If the prob147. BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 69; PARFIT, supra note 69, at 390.
148. BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 69. See also Cohen, supra note 8, at 489.
149. If forced to choose, there may be good reasons to favor the total view.
See KAPLOW, supra note 137. See generally Tornbjörn Tännsjö, Why We Ought
to Accept the Repugnant Conclusion, 14 UTILITAS 339 (2002) (arguing the total
view and resulting repugnant conclusion is not actually repugnant). In regards
to “hybrid” views that apply total utilitarianism when the population is small
but average utilitarianism when the population approaches the size of ours,
see Philip G. Peters, Implications of the Nonidentity Problem for State Regulation of Reproductive Liberty, in HARMING FUTURE PERSONS 317, 326 (Melinda
A. Roberts & David T. Wasserman eds., 2009) (citing Thomas Hurka, Value
and Population Size, 93 ETHICS 496, 497 (1983)), I have argued that any view
relying too heavily on average utilitarianism seems problematic in how it
identifies what is wrong with reproduction when we believe it to be wrongful.
See Cohen, supra note 8, at 489–93. Such views suggest that the wrongfulness
of a reproductive act depends on whether the child created is above or below
the average utility of all other existing individuals–but that seems deeply
counterintuitive. Why should the wrongfulness of my reproductive activity be
measured relative to that of other reproducers in my society? The average utility of the world is quite different today than in 1850, which means that producing the same child could be morally permissible in 1850 but morally impermissible today. Consider your own life. Most of us think that our parents
did not act wrongly by producing us. And yet this approach would suggest that
to know if that is right we would have to compare our utility with that of all
other persons in society at the moment of our birth, and if we fall below the
mean our existence could validly (indeed should) have been prohibited. Indeed,
if tomorrow, other parents begin having children with much higher utility
than our own utility, then our reproduction which was permissible today
would suddenly become wrongful tomorrow, notwithstanding that no fact
about our own lives have changed. This is deeply counterintuitive.
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lem with the kinds of reproduction we are discussing is that it
imposes costs on third parties in the form of governmental
spending, we could in theory allow individuals to buy their way
out of the problem by putting up a bond in advance for expens150
es. Of course, estimating in advance the cost of the externalities would be difficult but we could set it conservatively at five
times our best guess of the cost in order to be safe.
While this may seem fanciful, in some instances it would
actually not be very hard to implement: we could, for instance,
impose a surtax on IVF for single parents or on a commercialized sperm, egg, or surrogacy provision. The State could then
(theoretically) use that extra revenue to offset the externalities
caused by these children through things like grants to schools,
the juvenile justice system, etc. Doing so would not only substitute a less intrusive means of influencing the reproductive decision (taxation as opposed to criminal sanction) but also a tailored one that sought to target the precise harm that justifies
intervention.
Such a move would, of course, pose inequality concerns
since some individuals would not be able to pay the surtax to
access reproductive technologies. Such inequalities do not
strike me as particularly worrisome for at least three reasons.
First, these costs are not an arbitrary tax but one that is aimed
to make whole those harmed by the reproductive activity, thus
one analogy is to tort damages. The fact that some tortfeasors
are wealthier and better able to pay for their compensatory tort
damages (and thus less deterred from committing the tort in
the first place) does not make us think tort law is inappropriately inequitable, and it is not clear it should in this situation
either. Second, this would arguably be consistent with our current tendency in the United States to ration access to many
health care goods by ability to pay. Although many find that
tendency unjust, against this background, taxing some forms of
reproductive-technology use looks unexceptional. The solutions
to the larger problem—redistribution at a high level—might
take care of this problem too. Third, we could always subsidize
the poor as we do elsewhere in the health care system.
To be sure, there are practical issues here, but the more
important theoretical pay-off is that in principle the State has
150. Cf. Robertson, supra note 69, at 18 (noting offhand in the case of genetic abnormalities that “even if the conditions are more serious, if the parents
have knowingly accepted the risk and have the resources to rear their child, no
harm to others will occur”).
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no good reason to intervene in the ways discussed in Part I as
to those parties willing to pay for the externalities caused by
their reproduction.
7. The Specter of the New Eugenics
Like the Non-Person-Affecting Principle approach, the Reproductive Externalities approach threatens to rely on objec151
tionable eugenic premises. Expressively, it threatens to suggest to a member of the set of individuals it targets (or at least
to the children who sneak past its gates and come into existence): “we are expending state resources to prevent people like
you from coming into existence because we think the world is
better off if people like you (physically disabled, mentally retarded, raised by LGBT or single parents, etc.) were replaced
by other people.” This is a far cry from the goal of preventing
harm to vulnerable populations that underlies much of the appeal of BIRC reasoning. This is not to say that such reasoning
is necessarily invalid, but it does require a direct confrontation
with the eugenics movements of old and the question of what
made the old eugenics wrong.
In United States law, eugenics is most famously associated
with Justice Holmes’ claim in Buck v. Bell that “[t]hree generations of imbeciles are enough” as a reason to uphold a Virginia
policy of involuntarily sterilizing an allegedly “feeble-minded”
152
person who had already produced one “feeble-minded” child.
Eugenics was notorious as a central part of the Nazi movement
that seized on the notion of blood, called for the purification of
their nation’s gene pool in order to “regain the nobility and
greatness of their genetically pure forebears,” and gave rise to
prohibitions on sexual relations between Jews and Aryans,
“Genetic Courts passing judgment on [] genetic fitness,” marriage advice clinics, and ultimately mass sterilization and eu153
thanasia programs targeting Jews and other minorities.
It may seem fatal that the Reproductive Externalities justification, with its focus on how the birth of certain kinds of children harms the rest of us, echoes the rhetoric of this movement.
As Buchanan and his co-authors caution, “the central theses of
a social movement, including its moral premises, ought not to
be dismissed because of the intellectual and ethical failings of
its adherents.” Yes, “[e]ugenics is recalled as the Nazis’ racial
151. Cohen, supra note 5, at 500.
152. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 205, 207 (1927).
153. BUCHANAN ET AL., supra note 69, at 38–40.
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doctrine, which it was, but to be a eugenicist, then or now, is
154
not tantamount to being a Nazi,” or at least not necessarily.
In more colloquial terms, we ought to be wary of trying to score
points by comparing our opponents to Nazis.
Elsewhere I have discussed two arguments distinguishing
the “new” eugenics represented by the reproductive regulations
155
discussed above and the old eugenics movements.
The first argument seeks to draw distinctions between the
means of regulating reproduction used. To summarize my conclusion in the companion piece, I think this distinction cannot
save reproductive regulations that use criminal law means, but
that things are less clear as to some of the other less intrusive
156
means. Imagine the State decided not to enforce surrogacy
contracts only as to a category of parents who were likely to
produce significant negative Reproductive Externalities—some
states already refuse judicial preclearance (and thus enforcement) of surrogacy agreements when the intending parents are
157
not married heterosexuals. Or suppose that instead the State
sought to fund abstinence education programs that target only
particular subgroups likely to produce these negative Reproductive Externalities, for example those with heritable disabilities such as deafness. This would certainly be less bad than involuntarily sterilization, but even the funding of informational
interventions to dissuade reproduction carries with it a worrisome message. And while one might distinguish the message,
“your existence is so unworthy that it should be prevented”
from “your existence produces negative externalities that society should not be forced to bear,” that distinction is one that is
likely to be lost on most listeners. Still at least for the less intrusive means, this may offer some room between the new and
158
old eugenics.
A second argument would seek to distinguish the old eugenics movement’s targeting of genetic unfitness and the
transmission of genes as the source of harm from the new eugenic movement, which in some cases is focused on preventing
children from coming into being whose rearing conditions (single parent, unaware of parent’s identity, etc.) produce negative

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id.
Cohen, supra note 5, at 502–03.
Id.
See Daar, supra note 25, at 43.
Cohen, supra note 5, at 503.
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159

externalities. Although tempting, I have explained in the
companion article why I do not find that distinction satisfying:
while these examples may not require condemning a person as
a repository of genes, in some instances they do nonetheless
condemn the person, the approach requires a very strong conception of genetic essentialism or luck egalitarianism that I
think may be problematic; to the extent we are restricting individuals from reproducing due to criteria that are not their fault,
160
the gap between the new and the old eugenics thus narrows.
For all these reasons, I find the difficulty in distinguishing
the practices discussed in Part I from the old eugenics to constitute an additional problem faced by the Reproductive Externalities, but perhaps not as serious a problem as the others I
161
have outlined above.
159. Id.
160. Id., at 503–04.
161. To be clear, finding any of these approaches unconvincing from a normative/political theory perspective does not necessarily mean that they cannot
serve as a constitutionally permissible justification for regulation under existing U.S. federal constitutional law doctrine. As I have discussed elsewhere,
what constitutional standard applies to regulations of reproduction, especially
those relating to reproductive technology, is underdetermined by existing doctrine and very unclear. See id. at 513–17. If strict scrutiny applied there would
be clear problems of underinclusivity hinted at above, cf. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541–42 (1942) (stating that Oklahoma’s distinction between
sterilization of “those who [had] thrice committed grand larceny” and those
who had thrice embezzled was constitutionally problematic), as well as
overinclusivity problems to the extent there are blanket policies for single and
LGBT users rather than individualized parental fitness testing. See Rao, supra note 28, at 1479–88 (discussing equal protection challenges for denials of
access to reproductive technology). Further, it is not completely clear that preventing Reproductive Externalities qualifies as a “compelling state interest”
under strict scrutiny. On the one hand, Holmes’ justification in Buck v. Bell
that “[it] is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate
offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind,” 274 U.S. 200,
207 (1927), while never overruled, is so reviled it might be an antiprecedent,
rendering problematic the Reproductive Externalities approach by association.
On the other hand, perhaps the family privacy cases discussed in Part I might
serve as guidepost: only very large externalities or externalized costs relating
to the ability of resulting children to don the mantle of citizenship would be
compelling, but the State is not free to interfere in order to realize some Platonic or Spartan ideal society.
On rational basis review, by contrast, preventing even small, attenuated,
or not clearly net negative externalities can count as “legitimate” state interests justifying regulation. Motorcycle helmet laws are a good analogy and have
been upheld based on the disability costs born by society of drivers who are
injured without helmets. E.g., Picou v. Gillum, 874 F.2d 1519, 1522 (11th Cir.
1989); see also Melissa Neiman, Motorcycle Helmet Laws: The Facts, What Can
Be Done to Jump-Start Helmet Use, and Ways to Cap Damages, 11 J. HEALTH
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***
The foregoing discussion suggests that the use of Reproductive Externalities as a justification for regulating reproduction is much more fraught and less convincing than it might
have initially appeared. Nonetheless, for reasons that will become more clear after I discuss the other possibilities in the
remainder of this Article, the externalities approach is likely
the best of a bad lot. What the limitations and concerns I have
raised here suggest, though, is that if we were to go beyond
best interests and be honest about Reproductive Externalities
as the reason for regulating reproduction, we would settle on a
much smaller swath of such regulation. In particular, we would
be justified in regulating only cases where (1) same-number
substitutions were likely, (2) externalities are net negative,
large, and not attenuated, and (3) we could not plausibly derive
a scheme by which individuals internalize their externalities,
especially given the implications for enhancement and the ex162
pressive closeness to the eugenics movement. Moreover, returning to the framework introduced in Part I.B.2, the showing
we should demand on these three factors should be greater
when the means of influencing the target decision is more, rather than less, (negative) liberty-limiting; thus, a more persuasive showing on these factors should be required when the
State seeks to prohibit certain reproductive activities altogether through its criminal law than when it uses informational
163
interventions.

CARE L. & POL’Y 215, 236–37 (2008) ( listing cases that analogize the “right to
choose to wear a helmet to reproductive decisions”). Under- and
overinclusivity are not problems on rational basis review. Williamson v. Lee
Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955) (noting that courts will defer to legislative
judgments that “[e]vils in the same field may be of different dimensions and
proportions, requiring different remedies. . . . [o]r the reform may take one
step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most
acute to the legislative mind. . . . [or t]he legislature may select one phase of
one field and apply a remedy there, neglecting the others”).
162. See discussion supra Part II.A.5–II.A.7.
163. Most forms of regulating reproduction that satisfy these limitations on
the Reproductive Externalities approach (especially as to same-number cases,
and less intrusive means of regulating reproduction) can also be endorsed on
the non-person-affecting principle approach discussed in Regulating Reproduction. Cohen, supra note 5, at 481–513. While I have some doubts about that
approach and find Reproductive Externalities somewhat preferable, the fact
that there is an overlapping consensus between these two approaches as to
some cases is further reason to think that such regulation is most justified in
those cases.
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Applying this analysis to the existing regulations of reproduction discussed in Part I suggests few if any will be justified
on this account. The two best candidates seem to be abstinence
education and the prohibition on incest between adult brothers
and sisters, but neither is assured. Abstinence education seems
more likely to be a same numbers case, and the means of influencing the target decision is informational, but the externalized
harms are uncertain, small, and attenuated. The genetic abnormalities from adult brother-sister incest are likely a same
number case and to portend larger and less attenuated externalized costs than the other examples from Part I.B.1, but given that they use criminal prohibition as the means of influencing the target decision we ought to demand a very persuasive
showing in order for this approach to be justified. I think one’s
ultimate verdict may depend on a separate normative judgment
about how much of an imposition it is to have a possible romantic partner declared verboten. The yuck factor here may tempt
us to dismiss the interest of the individuals in this case as
weak, but perhaps a broader reflection on the importance of
partner choice—both in rising social movements regarding gay
rights, and in the literary tradition of forbidden love epitomized
164
by Romeo and Juliet —might cause us to reconsider. In any
event, what this analysis suggests is that on the Reproductive
Externalities approach the State would be far more justified in
discouraging adult brother-sister incest if it used a less libertylimiting means of influencing the target reproductive decision.
As I have foreshadowed before, in the end I think the Reproductive Externalities approach, even with all its problems,
will end up being the best alternative to the now-dismissed
BIRC framework. In order to substantiate that claim, though,
the next two Parts consider the remaining alternatives.
III. WRONGING WHILE OVERALL BENEFITING
The Non-Identity Problem renders problematic the idea
that children are harmed if brought into existence with lives
worth living. The Reproductive Externalities approach shifts
the emphasis from harm to resulting child to harm to third parties. The approach I develop in this Part can be understood as
shifting the criteria for moral wrongfulness from harm to a conception of wrong absent harm, or as offering a conception of
harm where the fact that an individual is overall benefited is
164. See generally WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET.
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insufficient to save the act from being wrongful. I focus on
adapting one version of this approach suggested by Seana
Shiffrin in the wrongful life context, which I think is the most
fully fleshed out version developed with an eye to legal applica166
tion, but other versions of this approach also exist. Shiffrin’s
focus is on tort liability for wrongful life liability, but as I discuss below it is possible one might extend her views as support
for criminalizing conduct or some of the other means of regulating reproduction discussed above.
Shiffrin rejects what she calls the “comparative model” of
harm that treats harm and benefit as representing two sides of
the same scale and its “principle that one may inflict a lesser
harm on someone simply to benefit him overall, when he is un167
available to give or deny consent.” She instead endorses an
asymmetrical noncomparative approach on which “harm,” as
defined by Shiffrin, is associated with “absolute,
noncomparative conditions (e.g., a list of evils like broken
limbs, disabilities, episodes of pain, significant losses, death,
etc.)” and “benefit” is associated with “goods (e.g., material en-

165. See Cohen, supra note 5, at 518. It would be nice to call this “harmless
wrongdoing,” but because Feinberg has used this moniker to cover Legal Moralism as discussed below, see generally JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF
THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARMLESS WRONGDOING (1984) (discussing morally
wrong conduct that causes no harm or violates no rights), I use this somewhat
clunkier term to avoid confusion.
166. Shiffrin, supra note 6, at 119–20; see, e.g., Davis, supra note 7, at 12
(arguing that “disabled persons wishing to reproduce themselves in the form of
a disabled child. . . . violate the Kantian principle of treating each person as an
end in herself and never as a means only” because “they define the child as an
entity who exists to fulfill parental hopes and dreams, not her own”); Harman,
supra note 7 (arguing that “[a]n action harms a person if the action causes
pain, early death, bodily damage, or deformity to her, even if she would not
have existed if the action had not been performed” and “reasons against harm
are so morally serious that the mere presence of greater benefits to those
harmed is not in itself sufficient to render the harms permissible: when there
is an alternative in which parallel benefits can be provided without parallel
harms, the harming action is wrong”); Kamm, supra note 7 (“[C]reators owe
their creations, at reasonable cost, certain things that I call the ‘minima . . . .’[which] involve more than just things that make lives barely worth
living . . . . [such that] I do not think that giving half a loaf, as distinct from
giving a whole loaf and then taking half away, is permissible if the half a loaf
falls below the minima.”); Woodward, supra note 7, at 813 (arguing from a
principle that “it can be wrong to adopt a course of action which will both
bring certain obligations into existence and make failure to meet them unavoidable, even though this course of action affects another’s overall interests
as favorably as any other course of action would”).
167. Shiffrin, supra note 6, at 119–22, 127.
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hancement, sensual pleasure, goal-fulfillment . . . ) . . . .”
Shiffrin then distinguishes between two types of benefits, those
that represent the “removal[] from or prevention[] of harm”
169
and a residual category she terms “pure benefits.” She argues
for a principle that it is permissible to inflict a lesser harm to
remove or prevent a greater harm, but wrong to do so in order
170
to confer a pure benefit.
For some cases both her view and the comparative view
produce the same result. To use Feinberg’s example, when a
rescuer must break the arm of an unconscious person (who
therefore cannot consent) in order to save him, the comparative
view suggests the action is right because the individual has
been overall benefited, the harm of the broken arm is out171
weighed by the benefit of being saved. On Shiffrin’s view the
action is also permissible, but for a quite different reason, because the harm of the broken arm is permissible because it is
172
done to avoid a greater harm.
In other cases, though, the two views diverge. Shiffrin illustrates using the fanciful hypothetical (hereinafter I will refer to it as Wealthy/Unlucky, and I mention precisely the facts
173
she does) of a wealthy inhabitant of an island (Wealthy) who
cannot set foot on another island nor communicate with its inhabitants. The other island’s inhabitants are comfortably welloff, but Wealthy desires to make them richer. The only way for
Wealthy to do this is to drop gold bullion cubes each worth five
million dollars from his airplane while passing over the island
knowing there is some risk he may hurt someone. Most people
are delighted by the gold drop, but one person (Unlucky) is hit
by a falling cube and his arm is broken. If Unlucky thinks that
all things considered he has benefited since the cost of repairing his arm is less than five million dollars (though he is unsure whether he would have consented ex ante to the risk)
then, on the comparative view the action is not wrongful—a
174
harm has been inflicted to produce an overall benefit. On
Shiffrin’s view, however, the action was wrong, because harm
168. Id. at 123.
169. Id. at 124.
170. Id. at 124 –27.
171. JOEL FEINBERG, FREEDOM AND FULFILLMENT: PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS
27 (1992).
172. Shiffrin, supra note 6, at 125.
173. Id. at 127–28 (setting out the full hypothetical).
174. Id. at 128.
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was inflicted without prior consent to bestow only a “pure benefit” not the avoidance of greater harm, and therefore Wealthy
175
owes compensation to Unlucky for that harm. Shiffrin thinks
176
most of us would conclude that Wealthy acted wrongfully,
suggesting her noncomparative view is the correct one.
Shiffrin then extends the idea to wrongful life cases, suggesting that no one is harmed by not being created, such that
being born confers on the child only a pure benefit but not the
177
avoidance of harm. We can apply her analysis to the kinds of
cases discussed in Part I: for example, in brother-sister
incestual sex one can argue that the parents have without prior
consent (which would be impossible in all our cases) imposed a
harm on the child not to avoid a greater harm, but to bestow a
pure benefit (existence). Therefore, they have acted wrongfully
178
even though they have benefited the child overall. While
Shiffrin ultimately marshals this analysis to justify tort compensation, at first glance one could also adapt the same argument to justify any of the means of influencing the target reproductive decision. Still to be fair, going forward I will ask the
reader to imagine these arguments as Shiffrin-esque rather
than Shiffrin’s own argument.
In the remainder of this Part, I consider several problems
with applying Shiffrin’s framework to justify regulating reproduction in our cases, which I order from more general to more
specific, namely: (1) in general the noncomparative approach to
harm is implausible; (2) as applied to reproduction, the argu175. Id. at 128–29.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 119–20.
178. At one point Shiffrin suggests that even if in a case like
Wealthy/Unlucky one is skeptical about the noncomparative view of harm and
thinks that the pure benefit (if great enough in amount) can morally justify
the imposition of harm, there are two other features of the procreative case
that makes her argument even stronger there: “[i]n most cases, the absence of
a pure benefit is experienced by a person or, otherwise makes a difference in
the content of his life” leading to the “strength of the moral impetus to bestow
pure benefits,” in that we can say Unlucky’s life is better with the benefit and
we think making his life better is good. Id. at 134. But “[i]n the case of procreation, though, this sort of moral reason for beneficence is not generated, because the potential beneficiary does not exist” such that “[e]ven if the failure to
bestow a benefit were on a par with harm [as the view Shiffrin rejects contends], the failure to be created is a ‘harm’ that would never, even indirectly or
as an opportunity cost, affect an ongoing person’s life”; that is, “[t]he fact that
the ‘harm’ or absence of benefit represented by not procreating will not affect
an existent person or her life in progress renders the benefit bestowed by creation far less morally significant.” Id. at 135.
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ment either proves too much (in suggesting that all procreation
is prima facie wrongful) or too little (in that many parents already share in the burdens of their children produced through
delinquent
forms
of
reproduction);
(3)
Shiffrin’s
Wealthy/Unlucky intuition pump contains several problematic
elements, does not map properly on to procreation, and is too
quick in dismissing the possibility of hypothetical consent; (4)
the approach faces particular problems in justifying means of
influencing the target reproductive decision that involve criminalization of behavior or impinging on bodily integrity. While I
ultimately consider her approach unpersuasive, I should make
clear at the outset just how brilliant I find Shiffrin’s argument.
A. THE PLAUSIBILITY OF THE NONCOMPARATIVE APPROACH TO
HARM
Shiffrin’s key insight is to examine how wrongful life cases
look different when harm and benefit are disaggregated
through a noncomparative model that distinguishes harm done
to avoid/prevent greater harm and harm done to confer a pure
benefit. Thus, her approach is only as plausible as that
noncomparative
approach.
How
plausible
is
the
noncomparative approach?
To begin with, it requires a rejection of most (if not all)
forms of consequentialist reasoning. Consequentialist theories
aggregate harm and benefit both within and across individuals
as opposite inputs into an individual’s welfare, such that some
amount of any harm (short of death perhaps) can be outweighed by some amount of benefit. Shiffrin’s view instead
suggests that pure benefits cannot cancel out unconsented to
harms such that there is a side-constraint against maximizing
what consequentialists might otherwise regard as the Good. Of
course this is not fatal to her view: among philosophers, deontological theories that constrain consequentialist reasoning are
highly favored, although even those theories usually conceive of
deontological side constraints being applied to baseline consequentialist theories. In any event, all I mean to emphasize is
that her noncomparative view of harm requires much more of a
break with consequentialism than do other solutions to the
Non-Identity Problem we have so far canvassed, and that alone
may make it implausible for those with contrary fixed moral
theory commitments.
Second, outside of reproduction, in areas such as tort and
criminal law theory more generally, several authors have at-
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tacked the noncomparative theory of harm espoused by
Shiffrin. In work on the comparative nature of punishment,
Adam Kolber offers this kind of example: Stuart viciously beats
a homeless man, after which Tommy, unaware of Stuart’s action, subsequently plucks three hairs from the homeless man’s
179
head. Because, according to Shiffrin’s noncomparative model
of harm, the homeless man is actually worse off after Tommy’s
actions than after Stuart’s, Kolber suggests that Shiffrin’s view
would say that Tommy harmed the homeless man more than
Stuart did, that this conclusion is absurd and only avoidable by
importing comparative notions, and that thus Shiffrin’s view
180
“cannot properly measure harm severity.” In his work on tort
theory, Scott Hershovitz has suggested that the paradoxes
Shiffrin identifies with the comparative theory of harm can be
resolved by being more precise and suggesting that harm is not
just any setback of interest, but a setback of someone’s interest
181
that violates a right they have. Others have also critiqued the
182
noncomparative approach.
For
those
persuaded
by
these
critiques,
the
noncomparative approach is flawed to begin with and therefore
Wronging While Overall Benefitting will not work as a justification for regulating reproduction. For those not persuaded by
these critiques, though, in the remainder of this Part, I show
why this approach still will fail.
B. PROVING TOO MUCH AND PROVING TOO LITTLE
Unlike the other BIRC-substitutes canvassed in this Article, Shiffrin’s framework might justify all (rather than only a
subset) of the regulations of reproduction discussed in Part I.
However, this capaciousness is also worrisome in that it
threatens to prove too much and condemn all procreation: as
Shiffrin recognizes, her argument suggests that wrong has
been done not only in the exceptional case of wrongful life but
also in all normal, healthy procreation, because even in the
normal case the child “must endure the fairly substantial
179. Adam J. Kolber, The Comparative Nature of Punishment, 89 B.U. L.
REV. 1565, 1579–81 (2009).
180. Id. Perhaps a proponent of Shiffrin’s view might refine the theory to
be comparative as between harms, but not as between harms and pure benefit,
to avoid this critique.
181. Scott Hershovitz, Two Models of Tort (and Takings), 92 VA. L. REV.
1147, 1164 –66 (2006).
182. E.g., Stephen Perry, Harm, History, and Counterfactuals, 40 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 1283, 1301–03 (2003).
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amount of pain, suffering, difficulty, significant disappointment, distress, and significant loss that occur within the typical
life,” harms that are imposed without consent only to bestow a
183
pure benefit (existence). If the argument requires us to accept
this conclusion—that all procreation is actually wrongful—for
most that will be a good reason to reject the argument.
Sensing the risk of a reductio ad absurdum here, Shiffrin
considers (although she actually does not commit herself to) a
weaker version of her claim that procreation wrongs another
without being all-things-considered wrong, in that “[o]ne might
believe that imposing overall beneficial conditions that nonetheless involve significant burdens is permissible, when the
beneficiary is unable to consent, if one attempts to alleviate or
partially shoulder the burdens one imposes”; that is, procreation standing alone is not wrong, instead what is wrong is “to
procreate without undertaking a commitment to share or alle184
viate any burdens the future child endures.” Shiffrin is not
very explicit about what she has in mind in terms of an obligation to share or alleviate burdens: most of her discussion centers on legal support (in particular financial support), though
185
some of her language suggests it goes further.
With this move, though, Shiffrin’s approach threatens to
prove too little to adequately justify the regulations of reproduction discussed in Part I. To the extent we assume arguendo
that there are extra deficits that children experience in being
born to and reared by LGBT parents or teenage parents, for example, it would seem as though those deficits are already being
shared by those parents in rearing the child, such that we
186
might say that these parents are already “paying for it.” This
183. Shiffrin, supra note 6, at 137–39. On Shiffrin’s view, the wrongfulness
of the action is not defeated because the lack of prior consent was due to the
fact that no one existed who could give consent—this is in part what leads her
to discuss implied consent, which I analyze below. If one thought the nonexistence of someone able to give consent was itself enough to create a wedge
between the procreative case and Shiffrin’s Wealthy/Unlucky hypotheticals,
then the case against her approach would be stronger still. In what follows,
though, I put this problem to the side and show other problems with her
argument.
184. Id. at 139.
185. Id. at 142–48.
186. Shiffrin herself seems to acknowledge something similar in suggesting
that “[f ]or those with relatively minor burdens (in contrast to those born in
difficult circumstances or with significant disabilities), parental support and
acknowledgement of responsibility may be all that is appropriate to expect,”
and suggests as a prudential matter that she might limit tort liability only to
cases where “people are hampered by extra burdens—for example, ever-
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is particularly true as to the case of increased risks of genetic
abnormalities resulting from incest, where the fact of a child’s
disability imposes many hardships on the lives of parents.
Shiffrin’s argument might do better in condemning as
wrongful the use of reproductive technologies by those over age
fifty if the prospective parent is so old that we think she is likely to die before the age of majority of the child, thus failing to
share in some of the burdens of the child. This objection to the
aged prospective parent’s behavior, however, might be overcome by the same means discussed for the externalities argument—by placing a bond to cover any support obligations upfront if she is unlikely to live long enough to give the child
support to the age of maturity; something similar could be required for single parents. Indeed, in the case of the aged parent
we might think trusts and estate provisions for the child already satisfy whatever bond requirement exists—although interestingly as a doctrinal matter in the United States, except in
Louisiana, there is no requirement that an individual leave
enough money to support their child through to maturity even
187
in the run-of-the-mill case.
A related concern with Shiffrin’s approach is it not clear
why it has to be the progenitor who him or herself bears the obligation of directly sharing the burden of the child rather than
ensuring that someone else can do so. For example, assuming
an older woman’s spouse is younger and willing and able to
take on support obligations should his wife predecease him, has
the couple acted wrongfully in bringing the child into existence?
Similarly, as to surrogacy or anonymous sperm donation, if the
intending couple who will ultimately bear and rear the child
can adequately provide for the child, why has the gestational or
genetic parent not adequately negated the wrongfulness of her
procreative act?
Shiffrin’s position on this matter is not entirely clear but
seems to augur against this form of substituted support. At one
point she suggests that an anonymous sperm donor as “an integral, voluntary, participant in the creation process [should not]
be able to avoid responsibility for the life he has created,” and
present significant pain, hindering disabilities, or life-threatening or shortening diseases.” Id. at 141–42. However, as I noted, when she discusses anonymous sperm donation there are hints she may actually countenance a more
expansive category. See infra note 188 and accompanying text.
187. See JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 519–21
(8th ed. 2009). Even the Louisiana statute allows disinheriting children for
just cause. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1621(A) (2008).
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thus “should not be able to waive the rights of the child to sup188
port or damages should that child be in need.” The last words
suggest that in fact the duty of support only kicks in given the
absence of another source of support, such that one might act
wrongfully only if one brings the child into existence without
someone else to support it. Later on, however, in discussing
anonymous sperm donation and adoption more generally,
Shiffrin suggests that to avoid wrongful actions parents must
not only bear financial liability but also “moral accountability
for the lives they create,” by which she means that “legal structures that permit biological parents, genetic donors, and gestational carriers to remain anonymous interfere with the child’s
opportunity to consult one’s biological parents in adulthood,”
and that those
who participated in the initiation of a life should . . . at the least, be
accessible to the child, at some point, to participate in a justificatory
dialogue about the child’s origins—that is, to discuss why the life was
created, to relay familial history, and to listen to the child’s account of
189
his difficulties and burdens.

Once again, though, it is not clear why on Shiffrin’s view
one could not negate the moral wrongfulness of procreation by
finding a substitute to provide these things. For example, why
would it not satisfy this duty if the parents of a donor-conceived
child told the child that, “We, your rearing father and your genetic mother sought a sperm donor in order to bring you into
the existence because we wanted a child to love who was genetically related to us and Daddy was infertile”? Why should
knowledge about one’s family history be connected to obligations to support a child financially or emotionally, and why
should either of those obligations be saddled exclusively on genetic parents when many others can be participants in bringing
a child into existence?
There is a divergence between a version of the argument
that is more relational—X harmed Y by creating her, therefore
X (and not Z and not society as a whole) must be the one to
make Y whole—versus one premised on the notion that it is
wrong for X to create Y without making sure that Y will receive
adequate support going forward. What is the wrongful act?
Producing a child who is not provided for, or producing a child
one ensures is provided for, where the parents who provide for
it are not its genetic parents?
188. Shiffrin, supra note 6, at 144 –45 (emphasis added).
189. Id. at 145.
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The former seems a much more defensible form of constraint than the latter to me, but what is important is that they
would justify finding wrongful quite different kinds of reproductive activities. On the stronger relational type of argument,
all forms of third-party assisted reproduction are all-thingsconsidered wrong because one parent involved in creating the
child does not provide support for the resulting child, whether
or not the child is adequately supported. Indeed, as applied to
gestational surrogacy this view might imply that the child is
wronged even if both of its genetic parents provide support, because the gestational mother who participated in its creation
did not provide any support—thus, the child is wronged for
failure of all three parents creating it to support it, even though
a child produced coitally would not be wronged if two of its creating parents supported it. This seems to undermine the plausibility of Shiffrin’s claim. Perhaps more pointedly, Shiffrin’s
argument would lead us to conclude that all single parent reproduction (assisted or coital) is all-things-considered wrong
and ought to give rise to a kind of tort liability in analogy to
wrongful life. On the weaker thesis, by contrast, only forms of
single parent and anonymous sperm donation (and possibly reproduction by older parents) might be wrongful, and then only
if they fail to ensure adequate support for the resulting child. In
any event, even on the stronger version of the thesis it is unclear
why finding a substitute is not an adequate form of corrective.
One could push this idea much further: what counts as
“adequate” support? If an over 50-year-old woman will be
around until the child turns eighteen, but not longer, has she
satisfied her duty of support, or does the support duty extend
beyond its legal limits to the age of majority? Is the duty to
support envisioned by Shiffrin one that depends on empirical
findings on what kind of environments children flourish in—for
example, suppose one accepted the (contested) literature on
single parent reproduction showing children doing as well as
those reared in two family households—or is it instead a hardand-fast rule irrespective of such empirical findings? If the latter, is it problematically hetero-normative and traditionalist in
that it requires two parents absent any showing of deficit?
Shiffrin’s discussions of these matters are fairly short, so it is
unwise to expect determinate answers to these questions in her
work. Just on its own terms, however, her approach cannot sustain most of the regulations of reproduction discussed in Part I
because it seems either overinclusive (in condemning all pro-
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creation), or underinclusive (in condemning only cases where
children are truly without adequate support, which will be a
minority of the cases, if any).
A separate more internal question for Shiffrin’s argument
is why parental support (financial and otherwise) has this
wrong-mitigating effect? There is a way in which we can think
of this kind of support as additional pure benefits added to the
child to make the tally of harm to benefit more favorable, a
kind of “boot” added to make up the weight of the harm, to bor190
row from income tax language. But if that is so, it seems we
have moved away from a strict constraint of “avoid doing harm
to confer a pure benefit” to a rule that pushes for something
like a more reasonable harm to benefit ratio. If the ratio of
harm to pure benefit is what matters, though, then we would
be forced to do a balancing of the harms of these kinds of lives
as against an assessment of the benefits of existing—the exact
thing the courts in the wrongful life context are loathe to do,
and Shiffrin’s approach seemed poised to avoid.
C. THE INTUITION PUMP, THE ANALOGY TO PROCREATION, AND
THE REJECTION OF HYPOTHETICAL CONSENT
The Wealthy/Unlucky case is Shiffrin’s main intuition
pump for her conclusion regarding the permissibility of doing
unconsented to harm to confer a pure benefit, so it deserves
close scrutiny.
As a threshold matter, I have to confess that I am quite
unsure as to whether I think Wealthy has done something
wrong to Unlucky on the hypothetical facts provided by
Shiffrin, especially if (as Shiffrin is willing to concede in a footnote) I imagine that Wealthy acted with the best of beneficent
191
intentions. Perhaps my intuitive reaction to the case is aberrant, but if more widely shared it is an interesting contrary da190. See I.R.C. § 1031 (2006). One response Shiffrin might offer is that at
least some forms of support actually allow the avoidance/prevention of harm,
not the conferral of pure benefit. That response seems inadequate, though, for
it only mitigates a harm that was created by the act of procreation, and while
one who mitigates some of the harm one has created does better than one who
fails to do so, it is hard to see how this completely erases the wrongfulness of
doing harm in the first place on Shiffrin’s view. This may be why Shiffrin resists committing to the thesis that support can adequately negate the wrongfulness of procreation and the view that procreation is all-things-considered
wrong holds some appeal to her.
191. See Shiffrin, supra note 6, at 128 n.28 (claiming Wealthy’s intentions
are irrelevant for her argument).
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ta point. Indeed, if we take the courts’ rejection of wrongful life
liability as a reflection of intuitions counter to that assumed by
Shiffrin, one might ask why it is the wrongful life intuition that
ought be reformed and not Shiffrin’s own intuition on
Wealthy/Unlucky?
Putting that issue to one side, let us zone in on
Wealthy/Unlucky. It is important for Shiffrin to find a hypo192
thetical case that has four facts analogous to procreation : (1)
the act done only confers a pure benefit (rather than avoidance
or prevention of harm), (2) the action was necessary (indeed the
only way) to confer the benefit, (3) consent was impossible to
get ahead of time, (4) and the individual is by her own conces193
sion better off for the act being done.
Because of the artificial nature of the hypothetical, I worry
that on at least two of these facts, notwithstanding Shiffrin’s
instruction to this effect, we are actually assuming the facts are
exactly the opposite, and this may be what is triggering the intuition in the direction Shiffrin reports. We are told that
Wealthy’s method is the only way to confer the benefit and that
consent was impossible to secure ahead of time, but everything
we know about real life suggests the opposite: bullion could be
dropped while individuals were asleep or shipped by boat, the
island’s news media could have been alerted to the drop.
Lest I be accused of committing the law student sin of
fighting the hypothetical, let me clarify: I worry that the hypothetical is so artificially constructed that the intuitions it is
generating among readers are actually a spillover from intuitions about the real world version of this fact pattern where
getting prior consent and conferring benefit ahead of time are
not impossible. This is not a criticism of Shiffrin per se, but of
recourse to the intuition pump method in general (a method
that I, like many philosophically inclined scholars, am fond of),
and a reason to be cautious about how probative are the data it
can provide. Our moral intuitions develop from real world

192. At one point Shiffrin tells us the island’s inhabitants are comfortably
well-off but Wealthy just wants to make them richer, id. at 127–28, presumably to make it clear that this is conferral of a pure benefit not harm avoidance.
It is not clear that this can map onto the procreation case, though. The children who are not yet born are not “comfortably well-off ”; in fact, they are not
anything, they just do not exist. It is possible that this distinction might also
spoil the analogy and complicate it as an intuition pump for the procreative
case.
193. Id.
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events, and the more we are required to imagine facts that are
in direct opposition to the real world, the greater my concern.
More substantially, I worry that Shiffrin’s hypothetical has
given us two pieces of information in tension with one another
(if not in flat-out contradiction) that may further jumble our intuitions. The first is that Unlucky, whose arm is broken, “admits that all-things-considered, he is better off for receiving the
$5 million, despite the injury,” but then in the next sentence
notes that “[i]n some way he is glad that this happened to him,
although he is unsure whether he would have consented to being subjected to the risk of a broken arm (and worse fates) if he
had been asked in advance; he regards his conjectured ex-ante
194
hesitation as reasonable.” In a footnote Shiffrin instructs us
that some readers may “think it clear, even rationally mandated, that they would agree to a high risk or even the certainty of
a broken arm for this payoff” but then instructs such readers to
modify the hypothetical to one for which they would be uncertain about their prior consent such as a year-long coma or a
195
gouged-out eye. I find this puzzling. What would it mean to
find a situation where I would admit I am all-things-considered
better off but have doubts as to whether I would consent?
Would not the refusal to consent in that action in such a situation actually be irrational? I worry that Shiffrin’s discussion of
doubts about consent is subtly undermining the premise that
the individual is (including by her own self-assessment) allthings-considered better-off.
This tension is a real problem for two reasons. First, the
requirement that the individual believes that he is all-thingsconsidered better off is crucial to Shiffrin’s argument in the reproduction case (though she is not explicit on this point) because without this stipulation we might worry that an individual has a life not worth living, an approach discussed above. If,
in their individual assessment they are better off, they necessarily have lives that they believe are worth living. If so, her
argument would merely demonstrate the already uncontroversial claim that it is wrong to bring people into being whose lives
are not worth living—a view the Non-Identity Problem does not
deny, and I have shown is unable to save much of the reproduc196
tive regulation of Part I.

194. Id.
195. Id. at 128 n.25.
196. Cohen, supra note 5, at 472–74.
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Second, in the reproductive case and beyond, the consent
stipulation Shiffrin gives is important because she goes to great
length to refute an objection to her view based on hypothetical
consent—that the divergence between intuitions on the rescuer
case and Wealthy/Unlucky is that while we assume that everyone would consent in the rescuer case, we assume that is not
true in the Wealthy/Unlucky case and (implicitly) that procreation looks more like the Wealthy/Unlucky hypothetical in this
197
regard. Shiffrin argues instead that generic hypothetical consent (not based on specific facts known about the victim and his
preferences) is insufficient when harm is done to confer a pure
benefit, especially when: “(1) if action is taken, the harms suffered may be very severe; (2) the imposed condition cannot be
escaped without high costs; (3) the hypothetical consent procedure is not based on features of the individual who will bear the
198
imposed condition.” The problem is that many of her readers
will think it very likely that they would consent to procreation
of their parents notwithstanding the potential that life will contain the usual amount of miseries, set-backs, and the like.
Shiffrin has a response to this concern that “a very high
percentage of people claim to be glad to have been born,” namely that “there are people who do regret being born and find the
burdens of their lives too great” while “[o]thers are strongly
ambivalent: [t]hey find their burdens are not entirely canceled
out by the goodness of their lives and regard these burdens as
ineliminable serious problems and intrusions” and “[a]lthough
sometimes these reactions are unreasonable, it is hard to dismiss
199
all these familiar, if unusual, reactions as wholly irrational.”
The problem with this response is that Shiffrin is now creating an asymmetry between Wealthy/Unlucky and the procreation case. In the hypothetical she stipulated that Unlucky admits he was all-things-considered better-off for having the gold
200
bullion dropped on his arm, but now, in explaining why we
ought not to be so sure of hypothetical consent in the reproductive context, she supports that claim by arguing that some in201
dividuals are not (by their self-assessments) better-off. More
formally, individuals are either (by their self-assessments) better off or they are not for the action having occurred. If individ197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Shiffrin, supra note 6, at 131–33.
Id. at 133.
Id. at 133.
Id. at 128.
Id. at 133.
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uals are better off if the action is taken and admit as much,
then it appears they would in fact have consented, such that inferring hypothetical consent is not a problem and Shiffrin’s argument has not overcome this objection and faces a problem; if
instead they are truly not better-off for the action being taken
and believe as much, then Shiffrin has only proven her point as
to lives not worth living where we think individuals are really
worse off for not having been brought into existence, and as I
have discussed, none of the regulations of reproduction discussed above can plausibly fit in that category.
It is possible Shiffrin means for us to distinguish between
whether an individual is actually made better-off (i.e., objectively) versus whether they assess themselves as having been
made better-off (i.e., subjectively) before the event versus after;
that is, that although Unlucky is both objectively and subjectively better off ex post he might have been subjectively unsure
ex ante, a sort of bounded rationality or affective forecasting
problem. However, if he is both subjectively and objectively better off for the act having been done, it is unclear why we ought
to give dispositive weight to his ex ante hesitation in a situation where it is both impossible to ask for his consent and we
cannot confer the benefit without acting. Moreover, when applied in the reproductive context, it is not clear what being subjectively unsure ex ante would mean. These children are not
subjectively unsure ex ante, because they are not anything ex
ante, they do not yet exist.
Harm and Benefit: A separate problem has to do with the
nature of the harm in the hypothetical. By making the harm to
Unlucky one of bodily integrity, it is possible that Shiffrin has
tapped into a separate intuition about inviolability of the body,
rather than a more general proposition of the wrongfulness of
harming while overall benefiting. This would track doctrinal
structures in tort treating bodily integrity violations as more
202
serious than emotional distress ones. Suppose instead of a
broken arm Unlucky suffered great embarrassment or sadness
but was overall benefited by five million dollars. Does the intuition remain that Wealthy acted wrongfully? If not, and we
think the kinds of harms that result from procreation are more
of the emotional distress type, the analogy between
Wealthy/Unlucky and procreation may break down.
202. See, e.g., Martha Chamallas, The Architecture of Bias: Deep Structures
in Tort Law, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 463, 489–510 (1998) (cataloguing and critiquing this tendency).
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Shiffrin’s conception of what constitutes “harm” in the procreation case might also be critiqued in a different way.
Frances Kamm, for example, has rejected the idea that the
things that give value to human life but which also cause pain,
such as moral consciousness, could constitute being in a
harmed state such that the normal acts of procreation could
203
cause harm. She worries “Shiffrin’s argument would lead one
to conclude that creating creatures incapable of moral choice,
never in pain, and unaware of truths such as the prospect of
death, like extremely happy, long-lived rabbits who have no
other problems, would be preferable to creating human persons
204
as they are now.”
Finally, on the benefit side, Shiffrin seems committed to
the view that her Wealthy/Unlucky hypothetical should generate the same intuition no matter the amount of pure benefit in205
volved. But it may be that the hypothetical works (again, to
the extent it actually pumps the intuition she claims it does)
because of her choice of the kind and amount of benefit conferred. The benefit—monetary—seems to come from a sphere
distinctly separate from the harm—bodily integrity—and thus
206
trades on a separate-spheres argument. If we altered that
fact and altered the kind and amount of benefit, we may get a
quite different intuition. To see this, keep the harm posed in
Wealthy/Unlucky as the broken arm and transpose it into the
procreative example: imagine that a parent reproduces knowing that their choice as to whether, when, or with whom to reproduce will result in a child with a broken arm at birth that
can be fixed the same way it can in Wealthy/Unlucky. Even after reading Shiffrin’s article, I think many would not have an
intuitive reaction that this parent did something wrong. If so,
that may stem from the fact that the benefit is at least partially
in the same sphere as the harm (bodily life and health vs. a
broken arm) and/or that the benefit is so much greater than the
harm (life is a much greater benefit than five million dollars).
If that is right, then Wealthy/Unlucky merely stands for a
203. Kamm, supra note 7, at 1382–84.
204. Id. at 1384.
205. I say “seems” because early on in the paper Shiffrin briefly imagines a
variant of the rescuer case where the arm is broken instead to provide benefits
like “twenty IQ points worth of extra intellectual ability;” however, she argues
for the act’s wrongfulness not because it is a benefit from a separate sphere of
the ( physical) harm, but because it is a pure benefit. Shiffrin, supra note 6, at
127.
206. See, e.g., WALZER, supra note 130; Brock, supra note 130.
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much more limited proposition and is not analogous to the procreative case.
D. CAN THIS VIEW SUPPORT CRIMINALIZATION OR BODILY
INTEGRITY INTERVENTIONS?
Even if Shiffrin’s theory can clear the hurdles discussed
above, we face a separate question of whether it can ground
criminalization or interventions that seek to invade bodily integrity such as sterilization (but from this point on I will just
discuss criminalization).
It bears emphasizing again that Shiffrin herself does not
argue that her approach can justify liberty-limiting restrictions
like criminalizing reproductive conduct; she instead suggests
that “one may agree that procreation is morally problematic
without entertaining any notion of directly regulating it” pointing to “[f]amiliar arguments against state interference with
rights of bodily autonomy and concerns about the terrific potential for state abuse” as “prevent[ing] consideration of such dras207
tic measures.” Shiffrin instead endorses a weaker regulatory
approach wherein those who engage in procreation “could reasonably bear some legal duties to compensate [the resulting
child] or otherwise help to shoulder the costs of this imposition,” which leads her to endorse a tort remedy similar to
wrongful life suits although limited for prudential reasons only
to the exceptional cases of “those born in difficult circumstances
208
or with significant disabilities.” Thus, on Shiffrin’s own view,
the framework she proposes will not substitute for the BIRC
justification because it does not support criminalization as a
means of targeting reproductive decisions.
Of course, it may be that Shiffrin’s framework but not her
own writing could actually support criminalization as a means
of influencing the target reproductive decision-making. To put
the problem more generally, is it morally justified to criminalize
activities that cause harm to but overall benefit an individual?
The substantive criminal law justification of choice of evils,
which in the words of the Model Penal Code provides that the
[c]onduct that the actor believes to be necessary to avoid a harm
or evil to himself or to another is justifiable, provided that: (a) the
harm or evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater than that
209
sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense charged, . . .
207. Shiffrin, supra note 6, at 139.
208. Id. at 139–42.
209. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.02(a) (1962).
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represents a tempting analogy. That analogy would suggest
that criminalization is inappropriate. Shiffrin’s noncomparative
approach to harm, however, suggests that this analogy would be
precisely mistaken in that the justification targets doing harm to
avoid a greater harm not doing harm to confer a pure benefit
that makes the individual all-things-considered better off.
Again, it is very hard to find a real world case (apart from
the procreative ones that are the subject of our inquiry) that
could be used to test intuitions about criminalization. Recall
that we need a case where (1) the act done only confers a pure
benefit (rather than avoidance or prevention of harm), (2) the
action was necessary (indeed the only way) to confer the benefit, (3) consent was impossible to get ahead of time, and (4) the
individual is (including by her own subjective ex post selfassessment) better off. Therefore, perhaps returning to
Shiffrin’s Wealthy/Unlucky hypothetical—despite some of my
misgivings about it above—will be more useful.
The question thus becomes, would it be desirable to criminalize the actions taken by Wealthy in Shiffrin’s hypothetical?
Imagine for the moment that we are residents of the island
on which Unlucky lives and where Wealthy has decided to drop
gold bullion cubes. Ours is a small island with a legislature in
which every citizen can vote, and a spy provides us with information on Wealthy’s plans including his poor targeting and the
risk that one of us may be Unlucky—although none of us knows
who that might be and we are all at equal risk and we are
without protective measures. One of our members then suggests that we pass a law criminalizing exactly Wealthy’s behavior, which we will publicize to him via a sign on a hot air balloon announcing that if he attempts the action we will bring
down his plane and imprison him. Behind a kind of veil of ignorance—not knowing who if anyone will have their arm broken
and whether that (admittedly better-off ex post) person would if
asked ex post also be unsure as to whether they would have
consented ex ante—would you support passing such a law, assuming it will certainly have the desired effect of deterring
Wealthy from acting?
Imagine that one member of the legislature instead argues:
Everyone agrees that even if one is Unlucky, the gold bullion cube
clearly makes the one hit better off, and even if there are a very small
number amongst us who are not sure ex post whether they would
consent to have their arm broken for five million, the vast majority of
us are sure we would consent. We can only prevent the harm (which in
fact does not make that person worse off though he might not consent
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to it) to this small minority by foregoing the pure benefit. I am not sure
if I will be in the double minority of people whose arm is broken AND
are ex post unsure whether I would have consented, but am willing to
take that risk! Who is with me in opposing the criminalization?

Is it not likely that a majority of us would cast our vote
against criminalization when presented with this argument?
Again, one should be cautious about intuition pumps, but one
thing I think my variation on Wealthy/Unlucky unpacks is a
key difference between criminalization and tort recovery that is
akin to Calabresi and Melamed’s distinction between liability
210
rules, property rules, and inalienability rules. Inalienability
rules provide entitlements an individual cannot voluntarily
part with, while both property rules and liability rules confer
on individuals an entitlement that they can consensually part
with; property rules protect that entitlement by enabling courts
to enjoin (or in the criminal context deter by sanction), while
liability rules allow the violator to violate the entitlement but
with the court setting a price after the fact for damages the vio211
lator must pay. Shiffrin’s approach is akin to a liability rule
in that her approach to the wrongful life problem involves ex
post compensation for the aggrieved Unlucky—if he asks for it,
that individual is owed compensation for harm done to him
that conferred on him (and others) a pure benefit. Thus, it may
be possible to compensate him for the harm done (i.e., the broken arm) he did not and would not have consented to without
adversely affecting the welfare of all others—the others being
those who were benefited without being harmed (the many
Luckys who receive gold bullion without injury) and those who
are harmed but would have consented to it ahead of time if
asked because of the overwhelming benefit. Indeed, if Wealthy
would not drop gold bullion cubes (or would drop fewer cubes)
knowing he will have to pay tort damages, it is likely that all
these others in a Coaseian fashion would try to bribe Unlucky
into taking the risk by parting with some of their gold bullion
to allow the matter to go forward—and if Unlucky would accept
the bribe, this again might suggest the problem is the amount
212
of benefit.
210. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability
Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089,
1092 (1972).
211. See id.
212. This has interesting implications for Shiffrin’s claim, in the procreation case, that her theory best explains why parents, not society at large, owe
duties of support to children. See Shiffrin, supra note 6, at 140 & n.42. In fact,
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By contrast, if the hypothetical legislature were to block
Wealthy’s activities outright through criminalization, Unlucky
is protected, but at the expense of all of the other people who
would rather the gold had been dropped. Thus, with criminalization individuals are forced to forego a pure benefit without
harm (or a pure benefit for harm they would gladly consent to if
asked ex ante) because there exists some minority who are
harmed (but overall benefited) and are unsure if they would
have consented ex ante even though they concede they are better off ex post. If this minority was a large enough share of the
population, or if the pure benefit was small enough, we might
vote for criminalization behind the veil after all. However, as to
the procreation case Shiffrin is prepared to concede that “a very
high percentage of people claim to be glad to have been born,”
with only a minority regretting their birth or being ambivalent
213
about it.
To be sure, it is a very strange exercise (if even possible) to
imagine what a hypothetical legislature of not-yet-existing persons would vote as to the criminalization of reproduction. But
if, as Shiffrin maintains, the Wealthy/Unlucky hypothetical is a
good analogy to procreation and we can reason about this issue
through that (somewhat more tangible) example, then it seems
the same point should hold: even if harming while overall benefiting can justify a tort liability rule regime, it has a much
harder time justifying outright criminalization of reproduction.
Therefore, I find that even putting aside other concerns
with the Shiffrin-esque approach, it also runs into serious trouble justifying criminalizing reproductive conduct as the means
of regulation.
What about non-criminal means of regulation? While I
have suggested that for the Reproductive Externalities approach (among others) less liberty-limiting means of influencing the target reproductive decision—through the informational interventions of funding abstinence education, for example—
are easier to justify, it is not clear that this is true on the
Shiffrin-esque approach. If only a minority of individuals would
not consent to the life they were given from being born to a
teenage mother, while most treat the conferral of life onto them
as a form of pure benefit akin to gold bullion for which they
if we thought most individuals are both benefited by procreation and would
have ex ante consented, perhaps they should be the ones who have an obligation to support the Unluckys of the world as a form of Coaseian bribery.
213. Id. at 133.
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would gladly suffer broken arms in order to get, then discouraging early motherhood through abstinence education may be inappropriate for the same reason as criminalization. Indeed, any
means of intervention that would have the effect of reducing
the likelihood that an individual will procreate would have this
effect; in other words, any effective means of influence will pre214
sent this problem.
Although inventive and brilliant, for these reasons I find
Shiffrin’s framework inadequate to do the work of BIRC and
justify the regulations of reproduction discussed above.
IV. LEGAL MORALISM AND VIRTUE ETHICS
The Reproductive Externalities approach sidesteps the difficulties faced by BIRC by focusing on harm to already-existing
individuals. The two approaches more briefly canvassed in this
Part also focus on negative effects on others, but effects outside
of the narrow confines of harm, at least as understood in Mill’s
Harm Principle.
The first approach openly embraces the preservation of
traditional mores as a reason to limit reproduction, and Joel
Feinberg has called this approach Legal Moralism in the narrow sense—the use of criminal law or other regulatory tools to
deter acts which neither harm nor offend but undermine public
215
morality, in order to preserve traditional mores. The Legal
Moralist approach remains a possible avenue for justification,
but faces a few hurdles I discuss. I do not spend too much time
on this approach, because this is a well-enough tread ground—
most famously in the Hart-Devlin debates, and I have less to
216
add.
The second group of views can loosely be described as an
application of Virtue Ethics—the view that concern with the
virtue of the parents making these decisions justifies intervention. I concentrate on recent work by Michael Sandel and
Rosalind McDougall in this tradition on enhancement and sex
selection respectively. I show that many of the parental decisions at issue in the cases I have discussed are in fact conso214. By contrast, Shiffrin’s own preferred approach—tort compensation—
seems potentially easier to justify, although for the reasons discussed in prior
sub-sections, I am not sure why one should not conclude that the children in
these cases are already adequately compensated, and even requiring tort compensation has the potential to deter procreative activities ab initio.
215. See FEINBERG, supra note 14, at 27; FEINBERG, supra note 165, at 3–4.
216. See, e.g., FEINBERG, supra note 165, at 15.
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nant with their descriptions of parental virtue, and also show
that a parental Virtue Ethics approach may not escape the
Non-Identity Problem after all.
A. LEGAL MORALISM
BIRC-type reasoning may mask a quite different kind of
reasoning motivating the interventions set out above: Legal
Moralism, broadly defined as the use of criminal law (or other
means of influence) to deter acts that neither harm nor offend
but undermine public morality. One excellent example of an attempt to uphold a law on Legal Moralist grounds is offered by
Justice Scalia in his dissent in Romer v. Evans, the case that
invalidated a Colorado constitutional amendment prohibiting
all legislative, executive, or judicial action designed to protect
217
homosexual persons from discrimination. Justice Scalia chastises the majority for having “mistaken a Kulturkampf for a fit
of spite,” and argues that “[t]he constitutional amendment before us here is not the manifestation of a ‘bare . . . desire to
harm’ homosexuals . . . but is rather a modest attempt by seemingly tolerant Coloradans to preserve traditional sexual mores
against the efforts of a politically powerful minority to revise
218
those mores through use of the laws.”
A similar version is offered by Leon Kass in his essay on
cloning (and reproductive technologies generally) in praise of
219
“the wisdom of repugnance.” “Repugnance,” he argues:
[R]evolts against the excesses of human willfulness, warning us not to
transgress what is unspeakably profound. Indeed, in this age in
which . . . our given human nature no longer commands respect, in
which our bodies are regarded as mere instruments of our autonomous rational wills, repugnance may be the only voice left that
speaks up to defend the central core of our humanity. Shallow are the
220
souls that have forgotten how to shudder.

Among other things, Kass laments how reproductive technologies such as cloning (but we might add other reproductive
technologies) turn “procreation into manufacture,” and that
such technologies where the manufacturer “stands above [the
creation] . . . not as an equal but as a superior, transcending it
by his will and creative prowess” are “profoundly dehumaniz221
ing, no matter how good the product.” There are also ana217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

517 U.S. 620, 636–53 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 636.
See Kass, supra note 121, at 19.
Id.
Id. at 38–39.
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logues in other authors’ discussions of the sale of sperm, egg,
222
and surrogacy services.
A parallel justification here suggests that these regulations
of reproduction are justified not to prevent harm to the resulting child or third parties as such, but instead to prevent society’s slipping into moral degradation. Because the argument
does not rely on harm to resulting children, it effectively sidesteps the Non-Identity Problem. For the same reason, however,
unlike any of the other BIRC alternatives or reformulations,
the approach is quite unconcerned with the question of the welfare of these resulting children—Legal Moralism can condemn
acts of reproduction that produce very high welfare children, and
champion those that produce children with very low welfare.
In a few of the examples discussed in Part I—the criminalization of brother-sister incest, prohibiting LGBT (and perhaps
single individuals) from accessing reproductive technology—it
seems quite plausible to me that Legal Moralism of this kind
actually lies behind much of the legislative and scholarly support for these measures; that brother-sister incest is criminalized for the purpose of maintaining taboos that support the existing family structure, that denials of reproductive technology
to LGBT individuals have as their real goal the penalization of
or the expression of social opprobrium for what some might call
a deviant lifestyle rather than the prevention of harm to children, etc. For other regulations of reproduction, the application
of Legal Moralism may be less plausible as a motivation.
Legal Moralist justifications are avowedly illiberal in that
they require subscription to particular comprehensive moral
theories and thus take sides on what constitutes the good life.
To say that a particular argument pretends to offer a liberal
Millian Harm Principle justification when in fact it relies on an
illiberal kind of Legal Moralism is not to say that the latter justification is necessarily insufficient as a basis for government
regulation. That said, others (in much more complete and eloquent ways) have made the claim that Legal Moralism is an inappropriate basis for criminal law interventions, most famously

222. E.g., Scott Altman, (Com)modifying Experience, 65 S. CAL. L. REV.
293, 294 –97 (1991) (expressing a fear that markets may alter our sensibilities
in a way that leads us to “regard each other as objects with prices rather than
as persons”); Cohen, supra note 43, at 691–92 (discussing the possibility of
corruption, that markets in some goods may do violence or denigrate our views
of how those goods are properly valued).
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223

H. L. A Hart in his debate with Lord Devlin and Joel Feinberg in his volume on Harmless Wrongdoing, which appears in
224
his work on the Moral Limits of the Criminal Law. This is
one of the truly great debates in legal theory—whether Legal
Moralism has any place in a liberal polity and, if not, whether
we ought to embrace the liberal state—a debate to which some
of the greatest legal and philosophical thinkers have contribut225
ed. Given this intellectual firepower, I am modest enough to
say I have little to add to this debate itself—one will either be
convinced that Legal Moralism is an inappropriate basis for
criminalizing conduct (and perhaps some other interventions)
226
as I am, or not, and anything I can say in this short space will
not convince you otherwise.
Instead I see my contribution here as twofold. First, an
unmasking one, to expose the potentially problematic bait and
switch that is going on in much of the discourse about regulating reproductive technology, where Legal Moralist objections
are clothed in the guise of a BIRC argument aimed at protecting society’s most vulnerable. I suspect that many BIRC proponents of these measures consider themselves good liberals and
if forced to instead rely on illiberal Legal Moralist arguments
(due to the incoherence of BIRC ones), would no longer support
the interventions discussed. Further, in some cases including
LGBT access to reproductive technologies, the BIRC-type justification is sometimes offered alongside an illiberal Legal Moral-

223. See PATRICK DEVLIN, Morals and the Criminal Law, in THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 1 (1965); H. L. A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY
60–61 (1963); see also COMM. ON HOMOSEXUAL OFFENSES AND PROSTITUTION,
THE WOLFENDEN REPORT: REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMOSEXUAL OFFENSES AND PROSTITUTION (1957) (debating the appropriateness of criminal
sanctions for homosexual acts).
224. See FEINBERG, supra note 165, at 4 –8.
225. For a glimpse of the great minds who have engaged this question, see
MILL, supra note 13, at 9; JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, LIBERTY, EQUALITY,
FRATERNITY 135–37 (R.J. White ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1967) (1873);
Ronald Dworkin, Lord Devlin and the Enforcement of Morals, 75 YALE L.J.
986, 986–87 (1966); Robert P. George, Social Cohesion and the Legal Enforcement of Morals: A Reconsideration of the Hart-Devlin Debate, 35 AM. J. JURIS.
15, 19 (1990); Jeffrie G. Murphy, Legal Moralism and Liberalism, 37 ARIZ. L.
REV. 73, 76 (1995). For a truly excellent recent history and historiography of
this debate, see Harcourt, supra note 109, at 113–16.
226. Feinberg himself suggests that harmless immoralities might properly
be targeted through subsidies or educational programs that promote a particular vision of the good life, so long as criminal prohibition is avoided. See
FEINBERG, supra note 165, at 312–13.
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ist condemnation of the lifestyle, but my analysis shows the
BIRC strand adds nothing except obfuscation.
Second, from a U.S. constitutional law perspective, exposing what is styled as a BIRC justification as an illiberal form of
Legal Moralism is important because of increasing indications
that the latter is a constitutionally impermissible form of justification. In Lawrence v. Texas, the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated a statute criminalizing same-sex sodomy, and in doing so,
the Court in large part relied on Justice Stevens’ dissent from
Bowers v. Hardwick, in particular his claim that “‘the fact that
the governing majority in a State has traditionally viewed a
particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice; neither history nor tradition could save a law prohibiting miscegenation from consti227
tutional attack.’” A number of authors have taken this as a
rejection of the constitutional sufficiency of Legal Moralism as
228
a justification for the criminalization of conduct. If they are
right, and the interventions discussed in Part I (and even then
only a subset of them) can only be justified on Legal Moralist
grounds, they appear to be constitutionally suspect. Of course,
it is also possible that reports of the constitutional death of Le229
gal Moralism are greatly exaggerated.
227. 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003) (citing Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186,
216 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
228. E.g., Bernard E. Harcourt, Foreword: “You Are Entering a Gay and
Lesbian Free Zone”: On The Radical Dissents of Justice Scalia and Other
(Post-) Queers, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 503, 503–04 (2004) (“Lawrence
v. Texas, will go down in history as a critical turning point in criminal law debates over the proper scope of the penal sanction. For the first time in the history of American criminal law, the United States Supreme Court has declared
that a supermajoritarian moral belief does not necessarily provide a rational
basis for criminalizing conventionally deviant conduct. The Court’s ruling is
the coup de grâce to legal moralism administered after a prolonged, brutish,
tedious, and debilitating struggle against liberal legalism in its various criminal law representations.”); see also Donald L. Beschle, Lawrence Beyond Gay
Rights: Taking the Rationality Requirement for Justifying Criminal Statutes
Seriously, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 231, 262 (2005); Nan D. Hunter, Living with
Lawrence, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1103, 1106 (2004); Eric A. Johnson, Habit and
Discernment in Abortion Practice: The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act Of 2003
as Morals Legislation, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 549, 604 (2005).
229. Indeed, Justice Kennedy (who authored Lawrence and would be a crucial vote in its extension) dissented in Stenberg v. Carhart a mere three years
before Lawrence, regarding Nebraska’s partial-birth abortion statute, and relied on Legal Moralistic ideas (or at least ideas very close to it) to justify criminalizing partial birth abortions but not others, suggesting his rejection of Legal Moralism may be fickle. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 963 (2000)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“D & X’s stronger resemblance to infanticide means
Nebraska could conclude the procedure presents a greater risk of disrespect
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As I have done several times throughout this Article, I here
want to emphasize that not all of the means of influencing the
target decision are equal. In particular, some of the means other than criminal law regulation may escape this constitutional
problem. To wit, in Harris v. McRae, the U.S. Supreme Court
upheld Congressional restrictions on abortion funding notwithstanding its rejection of the criminalization of those same abortions in Roe v. Wade, invoking arguments very close to Legal
230
Moralism. If Harris remains good law after Lawrence, as it
appears to, then there is arguably room (as a constitutional
matter) for Legal Moralism in the State’s decision as to what to
fund, one of the possible means for influencing the target decision already discussed. Thus, subject to a possible Equal Pro231
tection type challenge or a charge of pure animus, Legal Moralism may permit the state to refuse to fund lesbian, gay, or
single persons’ use of reproductive technology (directly or
through insurance mandates) while funding that of heterosexual married couples, even though it could not make the same
distinctions through its criminal law. It is less certain whether
Legal Moralism remains constitutionally alive and well as a
justification for means of regulating reproduction falling between funding and criminalization—for example, whether one
can punish a lifestyle through the regulation of parental status,
or through tort law.
B. VIRTUE ETHICS
A different kind of response to the Non-Identity Problem is
drawn from a broad Virtue Ethics tradition. This tradition suggests that an action is right if the action is one that a virtuous
moral agent would characteristically perform under the cir232
In The Case Against Perfection, Michael J.
cumstances.
Sandel offers a Virtue Ethics style argument against enhance233
ment focusing on the parental virtues. For Sandel, the problem with enhancement “lies in the hubris of the designing parfor life and a consequent greater risk to the profession and society, which depend for their sustenance upon reciprocal recognition of dignity and respect.”).
230. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 315 (1980).
231. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
232. See, e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Natural Justice, 51 AM. J. JURIS. 65, 65–
76 (2006); Rosalind Hursthouse, Virtue Ethics, THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA
PHIL. (Edward N. Zalta et al. eds., rev. July 18, 2007), http://plato.stanford
.edu/entries/ethics-virtue/.
233. See MICHAEL J. SANDEL, THE CASE AGAINST PERFECTION: ETHICS IN
THE AGE OF GENETIC ENGINEERING 45–56 (2007).

1270

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[96:1187

ents, in their drive to master the mystery of birth . . . [because]
it disfigures the relation between parent and child, and deprives the parent of the humility and enlarged human sympa234
thies that an openness to the unbidden can cultivate.”
Can the regulations of reproduction discussed above be defended along similar lines, as attempts to inculcate these parental virtues? The Non-Identity Problem poses no obstacle for
an argument along the lines offered by Sandel. For him, like
many in the Virtue Ethics camp, the character of the agent doing the action is what is central in determining its wrongful235
ness. Thus, for Sandel, it appears that the practice of enhancement is wrong even if we grant that a given enhancement
benefits the resulting child because the parents engaging in
enhancement are acting in a way contrary to the parental vir236
tues. Because the Non-Identity Problem’s power stems from
demonstrating the lack of harm to the child, it is powerless
against this kind of argument, which does not depend on making a claim of harm to the child.
However, extending the argument into our context seems
problematic: to the extent the problem with the forms of reproduction at issue here is that they are thought to produce deficits in the children that they produce (as against the hypothetical normal child), it is not these parents that evince an
inappropriate lack of openness to the unbidden—they very
much are willing to accept the child that results—rather it is
237
the State that is evincing that attitude and seeks to interfere.
That may just mean that Sandel’s brand of parental virtue
is not a good fit for this context or must be supplemented with
another conception. In offering her own Virtue Ethics approach
to sex selection, Rosalind McDougall suggests that even if
“[b]ecoming a parent is . . . partly and justifiably a self directed
project,” the fact remains that “the primary purpose of a parent
234. Id. at 46.
235. See Solum, supra note 232; Hursthouse, supra note 232.
236. See SANDEL, supra note 233, at 1–4, 11–19, 94 –97 (emphasizing that
his argument is distinct from arguments against enhancement relating to
safety, autonomy, or distribution of benefits).
237. To be fair, the users of reproductive technologies as a whole are not
easily characterized as a population more “open to the unbidden,” in that trait
selection of sperm and egg donors as well as surrogates is rife in the industry.
See e.g., id. at 1–4 (offering several compelling examples of trait selection of
sperm and egg donors). My point, instead, is that the kinds of reproductive decisions targeted by the state, discussed above, cannot be easily condemned on
Sandel’s approach because these parents do not evince these attitudes he finds
inappropriate.
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is the flourishing of his or her child,” and thus there “seems to
be something unparental about an agent who creates a child
with no chance of flourishing, purely to satisfy his or her own
238
desire to have a child.”
Might we say that the parents in our cases act
“unparentally” by “creat[ing] a child with no chance of flourish239
ing, purely to satisfy his or her own desire to have a child”?
Notice that the strong way McDougall puts her criteria, children with “no chance of flourishing,” seems to rule out many of
our cases. Even if we assume arguendo that in our cases the resulting children—those raised by a single parent, a teenage
mother, gay parents, not knowing one’s genetic father, etc.—
have a lesser chance of flourishing, it is hard to say they have
zero chance of flourishing.
The deeper question, though, is whether a Virtue Ethics
approach centered on the child’s flourishing can really sidestep
240
the Non-Identity Problem in the way McDougall suggests. I
would argue that it is just as apt a description of the parental
virtue to say parents should try as hard as possible to prevent
serious harm to (or confer benefits on) their children, while accepting the child they have—like Sandel, McDougall emphasizes acceptance “[b]ecause a child’s characteristics are unpredictable” and “[t]he flourishing of the child is facilitated by the
parent’s embracing of the child regardless of his or her specific
241
characteristics.” The parents who would be subject to regulation in our cases (those who want to be single, gay, or teenage
parents, etc.) are acting consonant with these virtues. They accept the children that this regulation would seek to prevent
coming into being as they are, and the parents do not harm this
child (or fail to confer benefit on it) for the exact reasons suggested by the Non-Identity Problem. While I have focused on
the way the Non-Identity Problem renders harm to resulting
child arguments problematic, it has a symmetrical effect on
benefit to resulting child arguments. Put another way, it may
be that any view tying the wrongfulness of reproductive action
to the flourishing of the resulting child depends on some notion
of harm and benefit to a child, which is rendered problematic
by the Non-Identity Problem.
238. R. McDougall, Acting Unparentally: An Argument Against Sex Selection, 31 J. MED. ETHICS 601, 603 (2005).
239. Id.
240. Id. at 602.
241. Id. at 603.
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Even if I am wrong, and there is an account of parental virtue in which the types of regulation we have been discussing
can be said to target unparental action, there are further difficulties. First, there is a general difficulty for Virtue Ethics. To
the extent individuals propose clashing conceptions of parental
only some of which render these acts of regulation problematic,
how can we resolve these disagreements? Second, can this critique successfully form the basis of legal regulation rather than
merely serve as a marker for moral wrongfulness? Virtue ethics
is enjoying something of a renaissance in American legal cir242
In criminal law, specifically, a minority view has
cles.
emerged that suggests that concern for the character of the
243
perpetrator is a central aspect of criminal law, and there are
certainly categories of crimes (vice crimes such as gambling
and prostitution, for example) where the focus on character
seems still closer to the surface. Can the State use criminal law
to encourage and inculcate virtue in the would-be perpetrator,
even when the act that is criminalized is not at all harmful?
That is a big question, and one I do not purport to resolve here,
except to note that there may be concerns with marshalling
criminal law interventions here even if we thought there was a
good account of inappropriate parental virtues, and that Virtue
Ethics was an appropriate moral theory to guide political deci244
sion making.

242. Lawrence B. Solum, Virtue Jurisprudence: A Virtue-Centered Theory
of Judging, 34 METAPHIL. 178, 180–81 (2003) (reviewing articles applying Virtue Ethics to, inter alia, antitrust, civil rights, corporate, criminal, employment,
and environmental law, as well as offering a Virtue Ethics take on judging).
243. See Kyron Huigens, Virtue and Inculpation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1423,
1423–44 (1995); see also Darryl K. Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis in Criminal
Law, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 323, 364 (2004) (“In judging criminal conduct, virtue
ethics judges the defendant’s exercise of practical judgment, and thereby his
character.”).
244. Among the complications is that while the virtueless action may be
harmless in our cases (due to Non-Identity Problem reasons), unless the character of the parent is reformed by deployment of the law, that same character
may actually yield activities contrary to human flourishing in other contexts
where harm is possible.
There is also an open question of whether a Virtue Ethics justification is
constitutionally appropriate for criminal law interventions after Lawrence.
Some passages in that opinion seem to inter only Legal Moralism, while others
seem to reach further. Compare Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577–58
(2003), with id. at 571. As far as I know, there has been no discussion of this
issue among Virtue Ethics legal scholars or constitutional ones. As I noted earlier, see sources cited supra note 161, if strict scrutiny applies, these regulations will also face separate over- and underinclusivity problems.
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For these reasons, the Legal Moralist and Virtue Ethics
approaches seems unpromising as justifications for the regulation of reproduction.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, and in this larger project, I have shown a
deep tendency for courts, legislatures, and scholars to appeal to
a particular kind of justification for interventions that influence reproduction: the Best Interests of the Resulting Child
(BIRC). As to interventions that aim at altering when, whether,
and with whom we reproduce, I have shown that the NonIdentity Problem makes this form of justification problematic,
an insight that courts have themselves recognized in the
wrongful life category. Nevertheless, I have suggested that appeals to BIRC reasoning remain pervasive both because of an
unthinking transposition of an idea from family law, and because of the political theory advantages of adopting a Millian
Harm Principle approach focused on vulnerable populations.
I have also considered several other substitute forms of
justification that could potentially do the work of the BIRC argument: Reproductive Externalities, Wronging while Overall
Benefiting, Legal Moralism, and Virtue Ethics. For each, I have
suggested reasons why these approaches are unappealing as
criteria for moral wrongfulness and also expressed some skepticism as to their suitability as justifications for legal intervention, especially interventions that restrict liberty in serious
ways, such as criminalization. These facts, I believe, also partially account for the persistence of the BIRC argument in the
examples I have canvassed despite its rejection as to wrongful
life liability: it allows us to avoid confrontation with these unpleasant implications.
Where does this leave the regulation of reproduction? Of
the approaches I have outlined in this Article the Reproductive
Externalities approach seems to me the most plausible way
forward, though it may only be the best of a bad lot. Intriguingly, especially among bioethicists, it is the justification for regulating reproduction most seldom defended. My accounts of its
infirmities ( limitations to same-number cases, internalizing the
externality, attenuation of harms, etc) and disturbing implications (eugenics, enhancement) may explain why this is the
case. If we were forced openly to talk about Reproductive Externalities rather than BIRC, I think we would settle on a
much smaller swath of such regulation. In particular, we would
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regulate only in cases where same-number substitutions were
likely, when externalities were net negative, when the net negative externalities were large, when we could not plausibly derive a scheme by which individuals internalize their externalities, and when the means of influencing the target reproductive
decision are less liberty-limiting. As discussed above, I think
only the regulation of adult brother-sister incest and abstinence
education funding are plausible candidates for regulation based
on this framework, and even then I have my doubts.
This is a tentative assessment. My goal in this project has
not been to offer fine-grained assessments of particular reproductive regulations; instead, I have aimed to fundamentally rewrite the way we talk and think about regulating reproduction.
I hope that never again will policymakers, courts, and legislatures defend the regulation of reproduction on grounds of children’s best interest or child welfare, and instead recognize the
complex and unpleasant questions that locution camouflages.
While I have focused on a few particular regulations of reproduction, the lessons from this Article and the greater project
are also applicable to a much greater swath of reproductive activity, including cloning, chimeras, and other technologies still
further on the horizon.

